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Preface
This study has its origins in my participation in the Ontario Power 
Authority’s Conservation and Demand Management Program Development 
Advisory Committee in 2006 and 2007 while serving as a Program Director 
with the Pembina Institute. In discussions with local electricity distribution 
company (LDC) staff involved in conservation and demand management 
(CDM) activities that served on the committee, one of the issues raised 
was the role of the Total Resource Cost (TRC) test in the evaluation of 
proposed CDM initiatives. It became apparent that the test was perceived as 
a significant barrier to CDM program innovation, development and delivery. 
The opportunity to investigate the role of the TRC test in local utility 
electricity conservation and demand management activities more formally 
arose as a result of discussions between the Electricity Distributors 
Association (EDA), the York University Foundation and the Faculty of 
Environmental Studies. Through the LDC Future Fund the EDA kindly 
provided a grant for a study of the impact of the TRC test on local utility 
CDM initiatives.
The resulting study, presented here, recognizes the value of the TRC 
test in program design and evaluation. At the same time, the study identifies 
a number of areas where specific modifications and adjustments to the 
TRC test as currently applied by the Ontario Power Authority (OPA) and 
Ontario Energy Board (OEB) to LDC proposals for CDM initiatives could 
be made to encourage and facilitate such activities. More broadly, the study 
concludes that the most important barriers to LDC-led CDM initiatives do 
not lie with the TRC test and its application by the OEB and OPA per se. 
Rather the study finds that the most significant barriers relate to the wider 
regulatory and institutional framework for electricity CDM within which 
LDC initiatives occur and the test is applied. These types of barriers are the 
focus of the recommendations made here. 
Mark Winfield
Faculty of Environmental Studies
June 2009
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Executive Summary
This study explores the impact of the Total Resource Cost (TRC) test on 
electricity conservation and demand management (CDM) initiatives in 
Ontario, particularly those developed and delivered by local electricity 
distribution companies. The study comprises a literature review, case 
studies of cost effectiveness tests applied to CDM initiatives in other North 
American jurisdictions, and interviews with key CDM practitioners in 
Ontario. Specifically, the study examines
the existing institutional, policy and regulatory framework for CDM •	
activities in Ontario, including the roles of the Ontario Energy Board 
(OEB), Ontario Power Authority (OPA) and local distribution companies 
(LDCs)
the current role of the TRC test in CDM decision making by the OEB, •	
OPA and LDCs
the structure of Ontario’s approach to the regulation and funding of •	
utility CDM activities relative to provinces and states recognised as 
leaders in the CDM field
the impact of the TRC test as currently applied in Ontario by the OEB •	
and OPA on LDC-led CDM activities and initiatives.
The study finds that the TRC test occupies a central place in Ontario’s 
CDM policy framework. Historically, the TRC test was the key test in 
determining cost effectiveness of CDM programs by natural gas utilities; 
today it remains a primary screening and evaluation tool for CDM initiatives 
in both the natural gas and electricity sectors. The TRC test is widely used 
by LDCs as a planning tool to assist in screening CDM programs at the 
conceptual stage and as a refining evaluation tool at the design stage. In 
addition, demonstrating that a proposed CDM activity is TRC positive is the 
central requirement of the OPA when evaluating LDC requests for CDM 
program funding. The OEB applies the same requirement when reviewing 
LDC applications to fund CDM activities through their own rate bases. The 
TRC test is also central to the shared savings mechanisms (SSM) through 
which utilities receive a share of the savings associated with reductions in 
energy consumption flowing from CDM initiatives.
The study identifies a number of ways in which the TRC test as 
currently structured and applied may limit LDC-led CDM activities and 
thus prevent the realization of the full range of potentially cost effective 
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electricity-related CDM opportunities in Ontario. Some of the issues 
identified in the study relate to specific aspects of the test and its application. 
In other cases, the issues relate to the overall policy and regulatory 
framework for CDM activities in the electricity sector within which the TRC 
test operates. 
The Ontario government has made significant commitments to CDM 
through the June 2006 Supply Mix Directive and other directives to the 
OPA. However the study finds that the province’s CDM policy framework 
remains relatively incomplete in comparison to other, leading North 
American jurisdictions reviewed — namely British Columbia, California 
and New York. In these jurisdictions, the establishment of overall CDM 
goals and targets has been complemented by a substantial infrastructure of 
supporting policies intended to encourage and facilitate CDM activities. 
These supporting policies offer specific direction to regulatory agencies 
and utilities on the evaluation and assessment of potential CDM initiatives, 
including the specific tests to be employed in evaluating CDM opportunities. 
In some cases, such as California and New York, there is direction to 
consider such factors as the value of environmental externalities avoided as 
a result of CDM initiatives in the evaluation of CDM opportunities. In other 
cases, like British Columbia, mechanisms have been established to account 
for the social benefits flowing from initiatives targeted at low-income 
households. 
The study finds that, by comparison, the policy direction from the 
Ontario government to the OEB and OPA does not extend beyond setting 
targets and goals. It has been left to the OEB and OPA to determine how 
CDM opportunities should be evaluated and assessed, without further 
direction from the province. Perhaps not surprisingly, the OEB, on whom the 
bulk of responsibility for developing such frameworks has fallen, responded 
by building on its past practice with the TRC test. The result has been a 
relatively restrictive approach to the evaluation of CDM opportunities when 
compared with California or even British Columbia. 
The study identifies a number of steps that need to be taken by the 
province to strengthen and clarify the overall framework within which CDM 
activities take place. These steps include the following:
Providing clear direction to the OPA and OEB that all cost effective and •	
achievable CDM opportunities be pursued before consideration is given 
to additional supply options in electricity system planning. 
Rationalizing, consolidating and stabilizing the funding regime for CDM •	
initiatives. 
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Strengthening and clarifying the institutional arrangements for the •	
planning and delivery of CDM measures in Ontario, including the 
establishment of an office of energy efficiency within the Minister of 
Energy and Infrastructure to lead and coordinate the province’s efforts. 
Providing clear policy direction to the OEB and OPA with respect to •	
the evaluation of proposed CDM initiatives, including consideration of 
the avoided environmental costs and risks and potential social benefits 
associated with such initiatives. 
Promoting program innovation by providing greater flexibility to LDCs •	
in the initial years of new, self-designed program delivery, and applying 
alternative evaluative frameworks to programs aimed at achieving long-
term behavioural changes (e.g., education and awareness programs) that 
are necessary for constituency and capacity building, but that may not 
initially perform well under the TRC test framework. 
In addition to the policy level concerns identified with respect to the 
application of the TRC test in Ontario, a number of concerns regarding 
specific parameters employed within the test emerged in the course of the 
literature review and interviews. These issues include the following: 
The need to modify the avoided cost structure in the TRC models used •	
by the OPA and OEB to ensure that programs delivering deep savings 
and market transformations are appropriately valued, as opposed to the 
current emphasis on demand response and reducing peak demand. 
The desirability of employing actual utility specific avoided distribution •	
costs resulting from CDM initiatives, as opposed to standardized 
assumptions, for the purposes of TRC assessments wherever possible. 
Finally, the study recommends that the provision of greater clarity and 
flexibility to LDCs in the application of the TRC test to their CDM program 
proposals should be accompanied by a strengthened public accountability 
regime regarding the actual results achieved. 
The study concludes that while that Ontario has made electricity CDM a 
central element of its electricity and climate change strategies, in comparison 
with other leading jurisdictions in North America its electricity CDM policy 
framework remains incomplete. Significant gaps remain with respect to 
the policy direction given to key institutional actors within the electricity 
system, and the CDM funding and institutional framework is fragmented 
and confusing. The province’s new Green Energy and Green Economy Act, 
2009 has the potential to compound a number of these problems, depending 
on how it is implemented. A more complete and integrated policy structure 
is needed to facilitate and encourage the realization of the full potential of 
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CDM initiatives to contribute to the sustainability of Ontario’s electricity 
system. The recommendations contained in the study are intended to 
contribute to such an effort.
Summary of Recommendations: 
The Minister of Energy amend the June 2006 Supply Mix Directive to 1. 
require that the Integrated Power System Plan (IPSP) to be developed by 
the OPA incorporate all achievable cost effective opportunities for CDM 
before additional supply options are considered.
The Ontario Energy Board Act be amended to expand the mandate of the 2. 
OEB to include ensuring, 1) the pursuit of all achievable cost effective 
opportunities for energy conservation and energy efficiency, and, 2) with 
respect to the IPSP to be developed by the OPA, the inclusion of all 
CDM opportunities that are cost effective relative to supply options.
The Ministry of Energy and Infrastructure initiate a comprehensive 3. 
review of CDM funding mechanisms in Ontario, including the roles of 
the OPA, OEB and ministry, to rationalize and consolidate the regime 
to facilitate and encourage long-term investments by LDCs in CDM 
capacity and programming. 
The Ministry of Energy and Infrastructure establish within the ministry 4. 
an office known as Energy Efficiency Ontario to provide leadership in 
planning, co-ordination and delivery of measures for energy efficiency 
and conservation in Ontario. The office should be managed and 
supervised by a Director of Energy Efficiency who direct the ministry’s 
energy efficiency and conservation activities, projects and programs and 
reporting to the Deputy Minister of Energy and Infrastructure. 
The government of Ontario direct the OPA and OEB that while the 5. 
review of the potential cost effectiveness of proposed utility CDM 
initiatives should continue at the program as well as portfolio level to 
ensure the identification of poorly performing programs, the portfolio 
level assessment should be determinative of whether a utility’s proposed 
CDM activities are funded. 
The government of Ontario direct the OPA and OEB to consider 6. 
the avoided environmental costs of supply in evaluating the cost 
effectiveness of potential CDM initiatives. In order to avoid the complex 
challenges associated with determining avoided environmental costs on 
a case specific basis, avoided environmental costs of supply should be 
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dealt with as a fixed adder (e.g., 15%) to the benefits of CDM initiatives. 
Given the importance of these benefits to future generations, they should 
be subject to a zero or negative discount rate in TRC calculations. 
The government of Ontario direct the OPA and OEB to incorporate 7. 
an adder to the benefits of CDM initiatives directed at low-income 
households and communities in assessing the cost effectiveness of such 
initiatives. 
The OEB waive the TRC positive requirement for rate-based funding 8. 
of new LDC-initiated programs whose value is up to 0.5% of a given 
LDC’s total revenues for the first two years of program operation. 
Program operators be required to report to the OEB on program results 
and impacts at the end of the two-year pilot period. SSM benefits 
associated with these programs be tied to the actual program results 
achieved. 
The OEB and OPA develop an alternative evaluative framework to 9. 
assess the cost-effectiveness of educational and informational CDM 
programming intended to result in long-term changes in consumer 
behaviour as opposed to short-term reductions in electricity demand. 
The evaluative framework consider such factors as program reach and 
sustained impact on consumer behaviour assessed via appropriately 
designed and administered customer surveys and other social science 
research techniques. A portion of the total funding for such programs be 
held back pending reporting on actual program results. 
The avoided cost structure in the TRC models used by the OPA and 10. 
OEB be modified to ensure that programs delivering deep savings and 
market transformations are appropriately valued.
Actual utility specific avoided distribution costs resulting from CDM 11. 
initiatives, as opposed to standardized assumptions, be employed for the 
purposes of TRC assessments wherever possible. 
The OEB require that LDCs report annually on the results achieved 12. 
through their full portfolio CDM programming. The OEB publish 
the results of each LDC’s CDM portfolio in a clear, easy-to-read 
consolidated annual report, permitting comparisons of LDC CDM 
performance.
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1  Introduction
Ontario’s electricity system faces a series of major challenges. The 
province’s electricity-related emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs), 
smog and acid rain precursors, and hazardous air pollutants need to be 
dramatically reduced. In addition, it is projected that 80% of the province’s 
generating assets will need to be replaced as they reach the end of their 
operational lives over the next 20 years. Although virtually abandoned 
from the mid-1990s onwards, province-wide conservation and demand 
management (CDM) initiatives have re-emerged over the past five years 
as central components of the province’s electricity and climate change 
strategies. In June 2006 the province established a conservation target for 
the 20-year Integrated Power System Plan (IPSP)1 to be developed by 
the Ontario Power Authority (OPA) of reducing peak demand by 1,350 
megawatts by 2010 and 6,300 megawatts by 2025 through CDM measures. 
The was outlined in the province’s IPSP Supply Mix Directive2 to the OPA. 
The province’s June 2007 Go Green GHG emission reduction strategy also 
identifies CDM initiatives as major components of the plan.3 The Green 
Energy and Green Economy Act, adopted in May 2009, added the promotion 
of electricity conservation and demand management to the mandate of the 
Ontario Energy Board4 and expanded the mandate of the Environmental 
Commissioner of Ontario to include reporting on the province’s progress on 
energy conservation.5
Local distribution companies (LDCs) have emerged over the past five 
years as major delivery agents of CDM programming in the electricity sector 
and are expected to play a larger role in the future. LDCs have the potential 
to be highly effective CDM program designers and operators, enjoying 
high levels of trust and credibility with the communities and customers 
they serve, detailed knowledge of their markets, and growing technical and 
managerial capacity to design and deliver programs. However, the potential 
role of LDCs in CDM activities in Ontario has yet to be fully realized,6 
and the CDM efforts of LDCs to date have been criticized for an excessive 
focus on education and awareness programs as opposed to more ambitious 
initiatives that will transform markets and deliver major long-term reductions 
in electricity consumption.7 
LDCs currently have three options for financing CDM program delivery: 
They can deliver a limited range of standard programs with funding 
provided by the OPA; they can apply to the OPA for funding to design and 
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deliver non-standard custom programs; and they can apply to the Ontario 
Energy Board (OEB) to fund self-designed CDM programming out of their 
distribution rates. The latter two types of custom programming are expected 
to be a major source of CDM innovation in Ontario. The Green Energy and 
Green Economy Act, 2009 has the potential to add two more CDM funding 
mechanisms. Provisions of the legislation introduce the possibility of rate-
based funding for CDM programming offered by the Ministry of Energy and 
Infrastructure.8 This could include funding for programs to be delivered by 
LDCs. The legislation also adds a mechanism through which the Minister of 
Energy can issue `directives` to the OEB to establish conservation targets for 
electricity distributors (i.e., LDCs) and other licensees. Distributors may then 
apply to the board for approval of CDM initiatives designed to meet these 
targets.9
The primary test applied by both the OEB and the OPA in determining 
whether to fund custom LDC CDM initiatives is a cost effectiveness test 
known as the Total Resource Cost (TRC) test.10 This test is the primary 
CDM program evaluation tool used in most jurisdictions in North America.11 
It is a test that “measures the net costs of a demand-side management 
program as a resource option based on the total costs of the program, 
including both the participant’s and the LDC’s costs.”12 To be approved 
for rate-based funding by the OEB, LDC CDM initiatives must meet the 
TRC test requirements. The LDC proponent has to show that the costs of 
developing and delivering a CDM measure or program will be less than the 
avoided cost of supply achieved as a result of the CDM measure/program 
delivered. Similarly, the OPA board has adopted a requirement that all CDM 
initiatives funded by the authority, including custom LDC programming, be 
‘TRC test positive.’ 
The intention of the TRC test is to ensure that only cost effective CDM 
programs are funded by consumers though electricity rates. However, 
the TRC test in its current form has been identified as a potential barrier 
to LDC-led CDM initiatives by a number of observers and participants 
in Ontario’s electricity system, including LDCs themselves, and more 
broadly to the realization of the full range of available cost effective CDM 
opportunities in Ontario. Some of the key concerns that have been raised 
with respect to the TRC test and that will be explored in this study include 
the following:
The current TRC-based assessment employed in Ontario can work •	
against capacity building conservation initiatives that may not deliver 
short-term savings, but that contribute to larger reductions in the future.
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The TRC test may work against innovation as new programs and •	
technologies for which performance data are not available will not 
perform well under the test.
The test as currently applied by the OPA and OEB tends to encourage •	
the fragmentation of CDM programming rather than the integration of 
activities into comprehensive portfolios. 
The current test tends to encourage a focus on short-term demand •	
response initiatives as opposed to programming that will deliver longer-
term reductions in total energy consumption and market transformations.
The current test fails to capture the full range of benefits of CDM •	
programming, particularly as it excludes avoided environmental costs 
and social benefits from its calculations. 
1.1 Project Purpose and Research Questions
Assessments of the impact of the TRC test as applied by the OEB and OPA 
on CDM programming in Ontario to date have been informal and anecdotal. 
The goal of the study presented here is to provide a systemic, comprehensive 
and objective assessment of the impact of the test on the role of LDCs as 
CDM program innovators and delivery agents. The research was guided by 
the following questions:
What is the overall impact of the TRC test applied by the OEB and OPA •	
on LDC CDM initiatives and activities? Are, for example, potentially 
cost effective CDM activities not being pursued by LDCs as a result 
of the current application of the TRC test in Ontario? Does the test as 
currently applied discourage innovation in CDM program design and 
delivery?
How does Ontario’s approach to the regulation of CDM activities by •	
distribution utilities compare with the approaches taken in other North 
American jurisdictions that are recognised as leaders in CDM policy and 
programming, including British Columbia, California and New York? 
How can the TRC test as currently applied by the OEB and OPA be •	
modified to encourage and facilitate CDM initiatives among LDCs 
in Ontario? Are there other modifications to the existing regulatory 
and policy framework for CDM activities in Ontario that should be 
considered to encourage and facilitate such activities?
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The underlying premise of the study is that LDCs can and should play 
a major role in the design and delivery of CDM programming in Ontario. 
At the same time the study does not exclude the possibility of significant 
roles for other actors, ranging from provincial agencies to private sector 
energy service companies providing CDM services. More broadly, the study 
assumes that the province’s overall regulatory, policy and funding framework 
for CDM should be seeking to ensure the realization of all cost effective 
CDM opportunities in the province for a range of economic, environmental 
and energy policy reasons. A recent assessment of the sustainability of the 
OPA’s IPSP filed with the OEB for the purposes of its review of the plan 
highlighted the central role that CDM initiatives can play in optimizing 
the environmental, social and economic performance of the province’s 
electricity system.13 Finally, analyses of the recently adopted Green Energy 
and Green Economy Act, 2009 have highlighted the extent of the changes to 
the mandates of LDCs with respect to CDM, renewable energy and ‘smart 
grids’ flowing from the legislation.  The situation has led to suggestions that 
the OEB needs to reconsider the ways in which it regulates LDC activities.14 
The study explores potential directions for such a ‘new deal’ with respect to 
CDM.
 
1.2 Research Methods 
In answering these research questions, the project applies a variety of 
research methods including a review of the relevant legislation, regulations, 
policies, regulatory decisions and commentaries on the evolution and current 
application of the TRC test in Ontario, comparative studies of the practices 
used in other leading North American jurisdictions, and interviews with 
Ontario LDC CDM staff and other key informants in the field. The project 
proceeded through a number of stages:
A review of the current TRC test guidelines and their evolution, and of 1. 
key decisions by the OEB and the OPA with respect to the application of 
the test to LDC CDM initiatives in order to understand the requirements 
and operation of the existing test.
A review of the application of similar cost–benefit tests to CDM 2. 
initiatives in other jurisdictions. This stage involved the review of the 
relevant policies and guidelines and broader regulatory environment 
with respect to the application of the TRC test or similar tests to CDM 
initiatives in other leading jurisdictions in North America, namely 
British Columbia, California and New York.
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The conduct of key informant interviews on the impact of the 3. 
application of the TRC test by the OEB and the OPA on LDC CDM 
initiatives in Ontario. Key informants included LDC staff involved in the 
design and delivery of CDM initiatives that have been subject to review 
by the OPA and the OEB, and OPA staff. The purpose of the interviews 
was to understand the impact of the TRC test on LDC CDM program 
design and delivery as well as to better understand the operation of 
the broader policy and regulatory framework within which the TRC 
test operates in Ontario. A semi-formal interview structure based on 
a core set of questions was employed. The questions served as a set 
of guidelines that allowed the coverage of key research themes while 
providing flexibility to the interviewees to address other issues around 
these themes. The interview questions are provided in Appendix 1.
The integration and analysis of the findings from the documentary 4. 
review of the application of the TRC test in Ontario, the role of similar 
tests in other comparable jurisdictions, and the results of key informant 
interviews to provide an assessment of the impact of the existing 
Ontario test, the status of Ontario’s current practice relative to other 
leading jurisdictions, and potential directions for reforming the design 
and application of the test. A number of broader observations become 
evident regarding Ontario’s regulatory and policy framework for CDM 
activities relative to those in place in other leading jurisdictions. 
The development of overall project conclusions and recommendations 5. 
for the reform of the design and application of the TRC test in Ontario, 
and of the broader regulatory and policy framework for CDM activities 
in the province as appropriate.
The overall goal of the study is to provide recommendations to the 
government of Ontario, OEB and OPA for modifications to the TRC test to 
ensure that it encourages and facilitates the delivery of cost effective CDM 
programs, while continuing to protect the interests of electricity consumers. 
Key findings and results of the study may also be transferable to other 
Canadian jurisdictions where CDM initiatives must meet cost–benefit tests. 
Although alternative multi-criteria–based policy evaluation frameworks, 
such as sustainability assessments, are available,15 the study does not 
explicitly examine the underlying premise of the TRC test that a cost–benefit 
framework is the most appropriate means for evaluating proposed CDM 
initiatives. The implications of applying alternative policy evaluation models 
may be explored in future research.  
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2 CDM, LDCs and the 
TRC Test in Ontario
2.1 The Role of CDM in Ontario Electricity and 
Climate Change Policy 
Within Ontario, electricity CDM (sometimes referred to in other jurisdictions 
as demand side management (DSM)) has been defined to include a wide 
range of activities and programs, including conservation behaviour, energy 
efficiency, demand response, fuel switching and distributed generation.16 
CDM initiatives offer a number of advantages in dealing with the types 
of environmental, economic and technological challenges currently facing 
Ontario’s electricity system. These advantages include the following: 17 
Ongoing reductions in energy costs for energy consumers. This is •	
particularly important in the context of energy prices that are likely 
to rise in the future. Investments in energy efficiency can pay for 
themselves in savings to energy consumers over time, and the resulting 
savings are permanent and reliable. 
Avoidance of capital costs associated with the construction of new •	
sources of supply of electricity.
Avoidance of environmental and health impacts that would otherwise •	
flow from the construction and operation of new sources of electricity 
supply. The life-cycle environmental and health impacts of fuel 
production for non-renewable energy sources, such as fossil fuels and 
nuclear, would be avoided as well. 
Avoidance of security risks associated with conventional sources of •	
energy supply, particularly nuclear energy. 
Avoidance of political risks associated with dependency on fuel sources •	
or energy imports from other jurisdictions.
Reductions in losses of energy through transmission and distribution •	
systems.
Improved reliability of the electricity system by lightening the load at •	
the end of the supply/delivery chain, thereby enhancing the reliability of 
each link in the entire chain.18 
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Employment benefits flowing from investments in energy efficiency •	
initiatives as opposed to new generation.19
The first serious efforts at province-wide DSM initiatives in the 
electricity sector in Ontario occurred under the auspices of Ontario 
Hydro’s 1989 Demand Supply Plan. Unfortunately these initial efforts 
were abandoned in the early and mid-1990s as electricity demand fell in 
the context of deteriorating economic conditions, and Ontario Hydro and 
then the electricity sector as a whole were restructured.20 Interest in CDM 
re-emerged with the November 2002 decision to terminate the competitive 
retail electricity market that had been launched in May of that year and 
to freeze electricity rates. These announcements were accompanied by 
the provincial government’s commitment to reduce its own electricity 
consumption by 10% and by the provision of tax incentives for the 
purchase of energy efficient equipment by industry and sales tax rebates for 
consumers on the purchase of high efficiency appliances.21 The following 
June the Minister of Energy directed the OEB to conduct consultations on 
options for delivering CDM programs in the electricity sector. 
The January 2004 final report of the Electricity Conservation and 
Supply Task Force,22 initiated in June 2003 in the context of the difficulties 
encountered by the province in moving to a fully competitive electricity 
market, highlighted the key electricity policy challenges facing Ontario, 
particularly the need to renew or replace 80% of the province’s existing 
generating assets over the next 20 years and the need for a CDM strategy. 
The Electricity Restructuring Act enacted in December 2004 in the aftermath 
of the task force’s report, in addition to establishing the OPA to take overall 
responsibility for electricity system planning, provided for the establishment 
of a conservation bureau within the OPA, lead by a Chief Conservation 
Officer and mandated to provide leadership in planning and coordinating 
electricity CDM.23 
The legislation also provided for the issuance of directives to the OPA 
by the Minister of Energy. Directives were to have two functions under 
the legislation: First, they were a means through which the minister could 
provide policy direction to the power authority while the IPSP that the 
legislation mandated the OPA to draft was under development. Second, 
directives were to be the primary funding mechanism for the OPA’s 
operations and programming pending approval of the IPSP by the OEB. 
The authority is permitted to apply to the energy board for funding from the 
electricity rate base (via the global adjustment mechanism24) to carry out 
the mandates provided to it through directives. From June 2005 onwards the 
Minister of Energy began issuing directives to the OPA to begin pursuing 
CDM initiatives.25 
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2.2 The Role of LDCs in CDM Programming 
Local electricity distribution companies have been actively involved in 
CDM activities since May 31, 2004, when LDCs in Ontario were granted 
an approval to apply to the OEB for an increase in their 2005 rates in the 
form of their third instalment or tranche of the incremental Market Adjusted 
Revenue Requirement (MARR).26 To get this third instalment LDCs were 
required to spend the equivalent of one year’s return on CDM initiatives. 
Under this arrangement, in 2005 the OEB approved $163 million in CDM 
funding for distribution companies and also allowed distributors to apply for 
additional funding as part of the 2006 and 2007 distribution rate adjustment 
processes.
As a result of this funding, LDCs delivered a series of OEB-approved 
CDM programs (referred to as ‘third tranche’ conservation programs) 
from 2005 to 2007. These initiatives covered both residential and business 
sectors and provided a host of CDM programs ranging from residential and 
commercial lighting rebates to hot water heater tune-ups.27 In March 2007, 
the OEB announced that additional funding through distribution rates would 
be available for continuing third tranche programs until April 2008 and 
encouraged LDCs to apply. The extension covered a variety of programs, 
such as distribution system improvements, home retrofits, and school 
conservation education programs.28 
According to reports submitted by the LDCs and compiled by the 
OEB, LDC-designed and delivered electricity conservation programs 
resulted in the following electricity savings in Ontario: 163,051 MWh in 
2005, 521,228 MWh in 2006 and 361,089 MWh in 2007.29 Overall, LDCs 
reported that their CDM initiatives reduced peak demand by 257 MW and 
electricity consumption by 1,045 GWh from 2005 to 2007.30, 31 From 2005 
to September 2007, LDCs submitted 85 individual plans to the OEB for 
approval with programs covering conservation, demand response, line loss 
reduction and distributed generation.32 These results represent only savings 
from the programs approved by the OEB and funded through distribution 
rates. In addition to these programs, LDCs have been actively involved in 
delivering a set of OPA-approved province-wide conservation programs.33
It was expected that most CDM funding for LDCs beyond 2007 would 
be provided by the OPA (see below), either through the LDC CDM fund 
or through other OPA initiatives.34 LDCs still have the option, however, 
of applying directly to the OEB for funding through distribution rates for 
“programs for which no OPA funding is available.”35 
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2.2.1 OPA-funded CDM programs
In 2006, the Minister of Energy issued a set of directives to the OPA that 
were especially relevant to the CDM initiatives and programs delivered by 
the LDCs.36 A July 13, 2006 directive, following up the June 13 Supply Mix 
Directive, established a three-year LDC fund of an additional $400 million 
for CDM programs to be delivered by LDCs. The OPA was to organize the 
delivery and funding of these programs through contracts with LDCs.37 
The OPA identified four types of CDM programs that would be eligible 
for this funding, each of them distinct in terms of their design, delivery and 
overall role the LDCs play in them:38
OPA-designed programs with third party delivery and reactive LDC •	
support 
OPA-designed programs with third party delivery and proactive LDC •	
support 
Standard programs designed by the OPA and delivered by LDCs•	
Custom programs designed and delivered by LDCs.•	
To date the focus of the OPA has been on standard province-wide 
CDM programs delivered by LDCs. In 2007, the OPA provided funding to 
distributors for four standard programs.39 In 2008–2010 this increased to five 
standardised programs:40 Appliance Retirement Program; Electricity Retrofit 
Incentive Program; Every Kilowatt Counts Summer Sweepstakes Program; 
Residential and Small Commercial Demand Response Program; and Small 
Commercial Direct Install Program.
The overall result of the minister’s directives to the OPA and the OEB’s 
initiatives is that LDCs currently have three options for funding CDM 
activities:
Deliver standard province-wide programs approved and funded by the 1. 
OPA.
Apply to the OPA for funding for customised CDM initiatives.2. 
Apply to the OEB for funding for self-designed programs though their 3. 
distribution rates.41
Additional funding has been provided from time to time to LDCs as 
a result of CDM directives issued by the Minister of Energy under the 
Electricity Restructuring Act, 2004 in relation to CDM programming 
targeted at specific markets and income groups. The Green Energy and 
Green Economy Act of 2009 extends the directive mechanism for CDM 
purposes beyond the approval of the IPSP42 and introduces the possibility 
of rate-based funding for Ministry of Energy and Infrastructure-delivered 
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CDM programs and for LDC programming designed to meet conservation 
targets set out in directives issued to the OEB.43 At the same time, the new 
legislation eliminates the Conservation Bureau and position of the Chief 
Conservation Officer within the OPA. These institutional structures had been 
established through the 2004 legislation.44 
2.3 The Role of the TRC Test in OEB-Approved 
and OPA-Funded CDM Programming 
The primary criteria used by both the OEB and the OPA to assess 
applications by LDCs for funding for CDM programming is the Total 
Resource Cost (TRC) test.45, 46 The TRC test was first developed in 
California by the California Public Utility Commission (CPUC) and the 
California Energy Commission (CEC) who jointly published The Standard 
Practice Manual in 1983.47 This document provided a standardized 
methodology for conducting benefit–cost analyses of all utility programs in 
California, including load management and energy efficiency.48 The manual 
set up several tests for assessing the cost effectiveness of energy efficiency 
programs, including the Ratepayer Impact Measure (RIM) Test, the Utility 
Cost Test (UCT), the Participant Cost Test (PCT), and the TRC Test.49 These 
tests were intended to be used in combination to reduce energy consumption 
and increase economic performance of an overall portfolio of CDM 
activities. Since then, the TRC test has become one of the most popular 
CDM program evaluation tools used in North America.50 The TRC test has 
been used by Ontario gas utilities since 1995 to assess the cost effectiveness 
of potential conservation and DSM programs and to measure their CDM 
performance.51 
2.3.1 Application of the TRC test by the OEB
The OEB’s current Guidelines for Electricity Distributor Conservation and 
Demand Management adopted by the board on March 28, 200852 outline 
the application of the TRC test to electricity CDM initiatives. The March 
2008 guidelines replaced several policies and guidelines previously issued 
by the OEB, including the Total Resource Cost Guide issued in September 
200553 and revised in October 2006;54 the CDM Framework Report issued in 
March 2007;55 and sections of the Filing Requirements for Transmission and 
Distribution Applications that dealt with CDM-related applications.56
.
.
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The development of a common cost–benefit analysis framework for 
electricity CDM in Ontario, including the adoption of the TRC test as a 
key mechanism for screening and evaluating CDM initiatives undertaken 
by LDCs, was a long-term process that involved a variety of stakeholders 
and was influenced by various policy and regulatory developments. The 
experience of the OEB and Ontario gas utilities with natural gas CDM 
initiatives played a significant role in designing a framework for CDM 
activities in the electricity sector. 57 By 2004 Ontario gas utilities (Enbridge 
Gas Distribution and Union Gas) already had about a decade of experience 
with CDM programs. According to the evidence provided by Pollution 
Probe, these utilities had implemented a range of innovative and cost 
effective CDM initiatives that had reduced their customers’ bills by over $1 
billion.58 The OEB indicated on multiple occasions that it would be building 
on the natural gas experience in Ontario. As a result, the cost–benefit 
framework developed for the utility-delivered electricity CDM initiatives 
included a variety of elements from the gas CDM framework, including the 
use of the TRC test as a primary screening and evaluation tool. In addition 
to the natural gas utilities, a number of stakeholders, including the OPA, 
LDCs, industry associations and NGOs, contributed to the development 
of the TRC framework by participating in the OEB’s Advisory Group or 
other stakeholder consultations, filing motions to the OEB or submitting 
comments on various policy proposals. 
Most of the comments and concerns expressed throughout the process of 
the TRC development were specific and addressed particular components or 
assumptions of the test. The issue of excluding environmental externalities 
from the TRC calculations was one of the key themes actively discussed 
from the outset.59 Concerns with the calculation and attribution of avoided 
costs and benefits, free ridership rates, discount rate and consistency of the 
TRC inputs and assumptions were expressed throughout the process of the 
TRC framework development. A detailed description of the development of 
the current OEB guidelines is provided in Appendix 3. 
The application of the TRC test to all LDC CDM initiatives is not 
universal, particularly with respect to education and awareness programs. 
On November 4, 2008 the OEB approved an application for distribution rate 
funding by Greater Sudbury Hydro for several CDM programs, including 
a community awareness program. In its decision the board stated that “as a 
market support program, the Community Awareness program does not have 
any direct demand or energy savings associated with it and therefore this 
program is not measured by TRC test results.”60
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2.3.2 Application of the TRC test by the OPA
For its part, in its 2007 expenditure and revenue review application to 
the OEB, the OPA reported that it would use a TRC test to screen CDM 
programs implemented in 2007, except for educational programs. The OPA 
stated that the TRC test it planned to use would build on the OEB TRC 
model. The OPA also stated its intention to produce a standardized process 
for evaluating and reporting on all CDM programs funded by the OPA. 61
The OPA has developed a number of processes and documents, 
including the OPA Evaluation, Measurement & Verification Framework 
for Ontario Power Authority Conservation Programs,62 OPA Evaluation 
Protocols,63 OPA Measures and Assumptions List,64 OPA Cost Effectiveness 
Test Guide,65 and OPA Cost Effectiveness Tests Tool.66 One of the key 
EM&V documents created by the OPA — Evaluation, Measurement and 
Verification Framework for Ontario Power Authority Conservation Programs 
— provides a detailed description of the process of evaluating CDM 
activities.67 In particular, it reaffirms the role of the TRC test as the primary 
metric for assessing CDM program cost effectiveness and lists information 
required for conducting the TRC. It also states that the OPA will use the 
TRC test in accordance with the Total Resource Cost Guide published by 
the OEB.68 The TRC test methodology described in the OEB TRC guide 
has been integrated into the OPA Cost Effectiveness Tests Guide, which 
describes several standard cost effectiveness tests (including the TRC test) as 
well as describes and provides examples of how to apply the tests.69
Currently, a TRC-positive requirement exists for both standard 
(province-wide) CDM programs as well as for customised applications 
funded by the OPA. One of the key criteria for LDC custom programs is that 
all CDM programs “be cost effective and pass TRC, based on the OPA TRC 
tool and Measures and Assumptions List.”70 For customised CDM programs 
with measures not included on the OPA Measures and Assumptions List, 
LDCs have to apply to the OPA first to have any new measures added and to 
provide the results of the supporting research substantiating their assumption 
data. Some programs, such as promotional activities and local community 
events, theoretically had access to the OPA-administered Community 
Initiatives Fund (~$ 5.1 million). Programs funded in this way would not be 
subject to the TRC test. However, the program is currently suspended while 
under review. No LDC CDM activities where funded directly through the 
program while it was in operation. 71
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2.3.3 Role of the TRC test in the SSM
In addition to its role in the assessment of proposed CDM initiatives the 
TRC test also plays a major role in the Shared Savings Mechanism (SSM) 
that has been established by the OEB in relation to LCD CDM programs. 
SSM is an incentive mechanism that allows utilities to retain a portion 
of their net benefit from CDM initiatives.72 The mechanism, along with 
the Lost Revenue Adjustment Mechanism (LRAM) is intended to help 
distribution utilities overcome their reluctance to engage in CDM activities 
due to concerns they will lose revenues as a result of reduced energy 
consumption by consumers stemming from their CDM efforts. 
The SSM was first established by the OEB in December 200473 in 
response to a motion from Pollution Probe.74 Pollution Probe`s initiative 
was based on the success of conservation programs offered by Enbridge 
Gas Distribution Inc. supported by an SSM. According to Pollution Probe’s 
estimates, after nearly a decade of CDM activities Enbridge conservation 
programs had reduced customers’ bills by $785 million. The TRC is central 
to the structure of the SSM, as the OEB’s current guidelines reward LDCs 
with 5% of the net savings estimated by the TRC test. 75
The LRAM, for its part, is determined by calculating the energy savings 
for each type of customer and valuing those energy savings using the 
distributor’s board-approved variable distribution charge appropriate to each 
type of customer. In the result, the LRAM is calculated based on the kW or 
kWh impacts of each program and for each type of consumer (both gross 
and net of free riders) and not on the TRC test results.76 
2.4 The Current TRC Test Structure in Ontario 
Under the TRC test, benefits are defined as avoided resource costs.77 
These result from a reduction in the costs associated with generating, 
transmitting and distributing electricity, as well as those that accompany 
marginal capacity for the periods when there is a load reduction. For 
some CDM programs savings of other resources (e.g., natural gas, heating 
fuel oil, water) are also realized.78 Costs include the incremental cost of 
any equipment and all associated program support costs paid by both the 
utility and the participants. These include costs associated with equipment 
operation, maintenance, installation and removal, and administration costs. 
Any tax credits are considered a reduction to costs under the TRC test. 
.
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Based on the calculated costs and benefits specific to a particular 
measure or project, the TRC test then examines the potential benefits and 
costs of the project and uses a discounting technique79 to express these 
benefits and costs over the life of the program as a single number, referred 
to as the Net Present Value (NPV). For a program to be considered cost 
effective, the NPV should be greater than zero — that is, the benefits should 
exceed the costs.80
In Ontario, the evaluation of the cost effectiveness of CDM is a three-
stage process that is applied at the levels of technologies or measures,81 
programs82 and portfolios.83, 84 TRC tests have to be performed at each 
stage. First, a TRC test is conducted to evaluate the cost effectiveness of the 
CDM measure or technology. If the measure or technology proves to be cost 
effective, a program that supports it is developed and the cost effectiveness 
of the program is then assessed using the TRC test. Finally, several CDM 
programs can be grouped together and assessed as a whole. In this case all 
indirect administration and management costs are included and the TRC 
test is conducted to evaluate the cost effectiveness of the CDM distributor’s 
portfolio. This three-stage structure (measure/technology, program and 
portfolio) is a key element of TRC analysis in Ontario. 
The following chapter examines the approaches taking by US and other 
Canadian jurisdictions to the evaluation of proposed electricity and energy 
CDM initiatives, including the application of cost–benefit tests, including the 
TRC. The chapter then compares Ontario’s approach to those seen in other 
leading jurisdictions, particularly British Columbia, California and New 
York. 
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3 Cost Effectiveness 
Tests for CDM Initiatives 
in North America
3.1 Introduction
Ontario has not been alone in its efforts to promote CDM activities as 
part of its long-term electricity strategy. In fact, the province is a relative 
latecomer to the inclusion of major CDM efforts in its energy strategy 
relative to other North American jurisdictions. Rising energy costs along 
with growing demand for energy, the difficulty of adding new generation, 
and rising environmental concerns have significantly increased interest in 
the development and implementation of energy efficiency resources during 
the past decade. Government, industry and local utility companies in North 
America have become actively involved in promoting CDM programs to 
lower energy consumption, defer additional generation capacity, and meet 
environmental commitments.
Energy efficiency programs are broadly defined to include both demand 
response and demand reduction measures. A wide range of CDM initiatives 
have been developed and delivered in North American states and provinces. 
Jurisdictions differ in their leadership style and level of interest in pursuing 
energy efficiency programs, the responsibilities assigned to key players, and 
the actual process of designing and implementing CDM programs.
Similar CDM programs implemented in different locales or by 
different utilities can produce varying benefits and costs depending on the 
assumptions used and the way programs are implemented in Ontario.85 
In most jurisdictions, regulators have established a requirement for CDM 
programs to meet certain criteria in some form of benefit–cost test. The 
cost–benefit analyses are primarily aimed at ensuring that CDM programs 
actually deliver energy savings and that spending on CDM is the more 
economical option compared to investing in new supply. In many cases 
the approaches taken in other jurisdictions are quite different from those 
employed in Ontario. 
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In most jurisdictions cost–benefit tests are used as a screening tool to 
ensure that CDM programs or portfolios are developed cost effectively, 
as well as a retrospective evaluation tool to assess the programs delivered 
and to identify potential improvements in program design and delivery.86 
The cost–benefit method chosen for the screening and evaluation of CDM 
programs by a regulator or an LDC within a particular jurisdiction can 
have significant impact on the scope, scale and type of the CDM initiatives 
delivered in that jurisdiction. In addition to being used to decide what 
measures or programs are considered to be economic and worth pursuing,87 
the financial incentives provided to utilities to offer CDM programming, like 
the LRAM and SSM in Ontario, are often linked to the cost–benefit results 
achieved by these activities. 
3.2 Cost Effectiveness Tests and their 
Application in North America
3.2.1 Types of cost effectiveness tests for CDM initiatives
The TRC test is the primary CDM program evaluation tool used in 
most jurisdictions of North America.88 It is, however, not the only cost 
effectiveness test available. Other tests, such as the Societal Cost Test 
(SCT), the Rate Impact Measure (RIM) test, and the Participant Cost Test 
(PCT), have been developed and implemented either as a supplement or 
an alternative to the TRC test. Although a detailed overview of these tests 
is beyond the scope of this report, this section provides a brief description 
of alternatives to the TRC test. This overview is largely based on the 
description of tests provided in the California Standard Practice Manual and 
the discussion of the cost effectiveness tests by Amann (2006).89 
3.2.1.1   Societal Cost Test (SCT)
The SCT is a modification of the TRC test. Structurally similar to the TRC 
test, it expands the test to include the effects of externalities (environmental, 
energy security, and so on) as CDM program costs, excludes tax credit 
benefits, and uses a societal discount rate rather than market rate.90, 91 
Marginal costs used in the SCT include avoided costs of power generation, 
transmission and distribution not captured by the market. An example 
would be external costs of environmental damage resulting from emissions 
of common air pollutants or GHGs. Another example of an externality 
would be the benefit of increased system reliability or increased customer 
satisfaction with the service provided by the LDC.
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The question of whether environmental externalities should be included 
in cost–benefit tests of CDM measures is highly debated. Proponents 
of the SCT point to the fact that including externalities will bring more 
conservation projects to the market and, therefore, have a positive impact 
on the environment. Others counter that assigning an economic value to 
externalities can be an ambiguous and highly subjective process. SCTs, 
including consideration of avoided externalities, are current employed 
(alone or in combination with other benefit–cost tests) in Oregon, Vermont, 
Minnesota, Maine and Wisconsin.92 In Ontario, a variation of the SCT was 
used in the first few years of gas CDM programs before switching to the 
current TRC practice that excludes externalities.93
3.2.1.2   Participant Cost Test (PCT)
The PCT measures the quantifiable benefits and cost of the CDM initiative 
to program participants. It aims to answer the following questions: Will the 
customer be better off by participating in the program than not? That is, will 
the savings realized exceed the cost of participating (e.g., the investment in 
energy-efficient equipment)?94
Customer benefits include the reduction of energy utility bills, 
incentives paid out by a utility or third party, and tax credits. Costs to 
the participant include all out-of-pocket expenses (such as the cost of 
equipment purchases, operations and maintenance) and any increases in 
energy bills. The results of the PCT can be expressed in a variety of ways: 
as a net present value for the total CDM program, as a net present value per 
average participant, as a benefit–cost ratio or as discounted payback. 
One of the strengths of the PCT is that it can serve as an indicator of 
the benefit or desirability of the CDM program to customers. A drawback 
of the test, however, is that it is unable to fully capture all costs and benefits 
to participating consumers as well as to account for all factors affecting 
customers’ decision making.95 The test also ignores any impact on the 
utility and non-participants.96 It is usually used in combination with the 
TRC or other cost effectiveness tests.
The PCT is used in New York and California in conjunction with other 
tests to assess CDM program cost effectiveness.97
3.2.1.3   Ratepayer Impact Measure (RIM) Test
The RIM test evaluates the impact of CDM programs on utility revenues 
and operating costs and the ways these are likely to affect utility rates and 
non-participating customer bills.98 Rates will be reduced if the change 
in revenues from a program is greater than the change in utility costs. 
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Conversely, if program costs are greater than revenues collected after a 
program’s implementation, rates will increase.
The costs accounted for in the RIM test include costs to the utility of 
running the program, additional operation and maintenance, installation 
costs paid by the utility, cost of the efficiency technology if paid by the 
utility, and revenue lost by the utility as a result of the program over the 
lifetime of the efficiency technology or measure.99 The benefits used in the 
RIM test are similar to the avoided supply costs used in the TRC test. 
Also similar to the TRC test, the RIM test’s results are expressed as the 
net present value of the benefits minus costs. If the value is positive, this 
indicates that utility revenue has increased, and thus customer rates can be 
reduced. This test thus can serve as an indicator of the direction and scale of 
the expected change in customer bills or rates.100
3.2.1.4   Utility Cost Test (UCT) or Program Administrator Cost (PAC) 
Test
The Utility Cost Test (UCT) or Program Administrator Cost (PAC) test 
evaluates the impacts of CDM initiatives on the utility or administrator of 
the program.101 This test measures the net costs of a CDM program based 
on the costs borne by the program administrator (utility).102 Benefits include 
generation cost savings (energy and capacity), transmission cost savings, 
and distribution cost savings. The only costs included are the administration 
program costs and incentives paid to the participants.
3.2.2 Application of cost effectiveness tests in North American 
jurisdictions
The TRC test along with other cost effectiveness tests is used by distribution 
companies and regulatory agencies as both a screening tool to assess the cost 
effectiveness of potential CDM programs and a retrospective evaluation tool 
for programs that have been in place for several years.103
The cost effectiveness of CDM initiatives can be assessed from several 
perspectives — those of customers, of utilities and of society in general. 
The costs and benefits to different stakeholders vary according to the test. 
The RIM test, for instance, measures benefits from the perspective of an 
individual consumer, while the TRC test estimates costs and benefits from 
a broader societal point of view. Unlike the SCT, however, neither the RIM 
nor the TRC test accounts for non-energy related social and environmental 
benefits to society. All tests have advantages and limitations and are thus 
often used in combination to better analyze the cost effectiveness of CDM 
programs.
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The TRC test remains one of the most commonly used benefit–cost 
tests in North America; it is often used in combination with other tests.104 
Although using several tests to assess CDM has its advantages, it should be 
noted that tests differ in the costs and benefits they include; CDM programs 
can thus be rated quite differently by different tests. For instance, programs 
with relatively high kWh reductions are more likely to be cost effective 
under the TRC test than under the RIM test.105 Programs with higher kWh 
reductions can result in higher revenue losses (considered as a cost under the 
RIM test, but not under the TRC test) and can reduce the potential for cost 
effectiveness when the RIM test is applied.
Given that all cost effectiveness tests have their advantages and 
limitations, when deciding which test to use consideration must be given 
to the broader context of the jurisdiction’s energy conservation goals and 
the policy environment with respect to CDM initiatives. Most jurisdictions 
require CDM programs to be assessed using at least one of the standard 
program cost effectiveness tests in accordance with the methodology 
established in the California Standard Practice Manual.106 Tables 5.1 and 5.2 
summarize the primary and secondary cost–benefit tests adopted in different 
states in the US. A more detailed list of cost effectiveness tests used in each 
state is provided in Appendix 2.
Participant 
Cost Test (PCT)
Utility Cost 
Test (UCT)
Ratepayer 
Impact Measure 
(RIM) Test
Total Resource 
Cost (TRC) Test
Societal Cost 
Test (SCT)
 none CT, UT, TX FL CA, MA, MO, NH, 
NM,
AZ, ME, MN, VT, 
WI
Table 3‑1   Primary Cost Tests Used by Various US States
Table 3‑2   Secondary Cost Tests Used by Various US States
Participant 
Cost Test (PCT)
Utility Cost 
Test (UCT)
Ratepayer 
Impact Measure 
(RIM) Test
Total Resource 
Cost (TRC) Test
Societal Cost 
Test (SCT)
AR, FL, GA, HI, 
IA, IN, MN, VA
AT, CA, CT, HI, 
IA, IN, MN, NO, 
NV, OR, UT, 
VA, TX
AR, DC, FL, GA, 
HI, IA, IN, KS, 
MN, NH, VA
AR, CA, CO, CT, 
DE, FL, GA, HI, 
IL, IN, KS, MA, 
ME, MN, MO, 
MT, NH, NM, NY, 
UT, VA 
AZ, CO, GA, HI, 
IA, IN, MW, MN, 
MT, NV, OR, VA, 
VT, WI
Source: Price, S. “Summary of Energy Efficiency Cost-Effectiveness Issues”, E3, October 17, 2008, http://www.
docstoc.com/docs/2319130/Summary-of-Energy-Efficiency-Cost-effectiveness-Issues
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Only a few states require that programs meet all five tests.107 Since each 
of the standard tests analyses the cost effectiveness of a CDM measure or 
program from the perspective of a particular stakeholder (i.e., consumers, 
ratepayers, utilities, society as a whole), most states use more than one test 
for CDM program screening and assessment. Usually at least one required 
test is supplemented by one or two either optional or required tests.108 
The TRC test is the most common screening and evaluation tool 
for CDM activities. However, many jurisdictions also use the SCT, 
a variation of the TRC test that includes consideration of social 
and environmental costs that may be avoided as a result of CDM 
programs. 
Although the TRC test is not as restrictive as the RIM test, CDM 
program administrators in several jurisdictions recognise its limitations, 
especially the fact that it does not include non-energy benefits to society, 
such as avoided air pollution or GHG emissions or realized benefits to 
low-income households. To correct these limitations of the TRC test, some 
jurisdictions adopted some form of an SCT (effectively a TRC test plus 
externalities). Since it is difficult to put a precise price on environmental and 
social externalities, these jurisdictions often apply a rough ‘adder,’ such a 
fixed percentage of program costs, to the calculation of program benefits to 
account for the non-energy benefits of CDM programs.
The Maine Public Utility Commission, for instance, uses the Modified 
Societal Test to screen CDM programs. The structure of the test is similar 
to Ontario’s TRC test, except that it includes non-energy benefits, such 
as reduced operation and maintenance costs, productivity improvements, 
economic development benefits and environmental benefits, “to the extent 
such benefits can be reasonably quantified and valued.”109 In Washington 
State, conservation is identified as the ‘Resource of Choice’ and all CDM 
programs are given a 10% adder to the TRC test in accordance with the 
Northwest Public Power Planning Act of 1980.110
Another shortcoming of the TRC test is that certain types of CDM 
activities do not perform well under its framework. Specifically, with 
activities such as education and awareness programs that are needed to 
achieve long-term conservation goals, it can be difficult to establish the 
direct link between the activity and projected energy savings. In an attempt 
to rectify this problem, some jurisdictions have adopted special provisions 
for such programs. In Kansas, for example, the regulatory agency, the 
Kansas Corporation Commission, mandates that all energy efficiency 
programs be accompanied by educational programs to bring awareness to 
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customers in their homes and businesses.111 Although the commission uses 
TRC and RIM tests to evaluate its CDM programs, educational programs are 
exempt from these benefit–cost tests. 
In addition to variances among agencies in regulating which tests should 
be applied, there are also different perspectives on the appropriate level at 
which the tests should be applied. Many states focus on cost effectiveness at 
the utility program portfolio level rather than at the level of each individual 
CDM program. Applying the tests to the CDM portfolio as a whole has the 
effect of allowing some room for pilot projects and education and awareness 
programs that may not be able to meet the requirements of a given test 
individually.112
The following section explores the approaches taken with respect 
to the evaluation and approval of CDM programs in three leading 
North American jurisdictions: British Columbia, California and New 
York. These jurisdictions were selected based on their combination of 
past achievements in CDM programming and more recent adoption of 
significant policy and regulatory measures intended to facilitate and 
encourage the pursuit of cost effective CDM opportunities. 
3.3 Comparative Case Studies
3.3.1 British Columbia
3.3.1.1   Policy and Regulatory Context
British Columbia has been actively involved in CDM programs since the 
early 1990s and has recently emerged as a leader in CDM in Canada. The 
BC Energy Plan, released in 2007, set a goal of reducing the growth in 
electricity demand so that a currently projected additional demand of 10,000 
GWh by 2020 would be met through demand reduction measures, including 
energy efficiency, conservation, load displacement, fuel switching and small 
distributed generation.113 With this energy plan the BC Government has 
mandated an ambitious conservation target.114 The plan directs BC Hydro,115 
the leading utility company in the province, “to acquire 50 per cent of [its] 
incremental resource needs through conservation by 2020” and encourages 
all utilities to pursue cost effective CDM opportunities.116
To facilitate the achievement of these and other policy objectives in the 
BC Energy Plan, the BC Government made significant modifications to the 
Utilities Commission Act (UCA) — the statutory framework that governs 
public utilities in British Columbia. The resulting Utilities Commission 
Amendment Act (Bill 15) was adopted in 2008 with the aim of establishing 
a legal and regulatory framework to realize the objectives of the BC 
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Energy Plan. One of the most important elements of the legislation was a 
requirement that utilities pursue all cost effective CDM opportunities before 
relying on supply-side resources.117 The principal target of the provision 
is BC Hydro, which serves over 94% of British Columbia’s population 
and is subject to regulatory oversight by the British Columbia Utility 
Commission (BCUC).118 
The amendments to the UCA laid the groundwork for the Demand-Side 
Measures Regulation of November 2008 that outlined in greater detail how 
CDM programs were to be managed and evaluated.119, 120 
3.3.1.2   CDM Programs: Administration and Evaluation
To assess cost effectiveness of its CDM programs, BC Hydro relies 
primarily on the TRC test as a screening tool, though it also conducts the 
UCT and the RIM test on all CDM programs to evaluate program costs to 
the utility and its customers. The regulator, the British Columbia Utility 
Commission (BCUC), looks at the results of the TRC and RIM tests121 to 
determine whether to approve CDM initiatives. In the case of the RIM test, a 
threshold of 0.8 is applied (i.e., program costs to ratepayers to exceed costs 
by 20%) allowing for a small adverse impact on non-participants, provided 
the TRC test at least meets the threshold of 1, meaning that program costs 
and benefits are equal.122
The November 2008 Demand-Side Measures Regulation included 
several important provisions related to the screening and evaluation of CDM 
programs.123 One of the most important changes was the requirement for the 
BCUC to evaluate the cost effectiveness of a specified DSM “by determining 
whether the portfolio is cost effective as a whole.” Those specified DSMs 
include educational and community engagement programs, energy efficiency 
training, and technology innovation programs. The provision essentially 
acknowledged the benefits of these types of programs; though they do not 
perform well under the traditional cost–benefit analysis framework, they are 
necessary for the long-term success of CDM initiatives.
Another important requirement of the regulation is the consideration 
of the adequacy of the proposed CDM measures.124 For a portfolio to be 
considered ‘adequate’ by the BCUC it must include125
a DSM measure aimed at assisting residents in low-income households •	
to reduce their energy consumption
a DSM measure aimed at improving the energy efficiency of rental •	
accommodations (after June 1, 2009)
an education program for students in schools in the utility’s service area.•	
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While mandating these required elements in the CDM portfolio mix, the 
regulation does not specify program designs, giving utilities some flexibility 
in terms of what CDM options to pursue. BC Hydro, for its part, offers two 
types of CDM measures for low-income households: free energy saving kits 
(small savings, broad target) and free home audits (bigger savings, smaller 
targeted audience).126
A final important provision under BC’s DSM regulation deals with 
externalities — social benefits not normally included in traditional cost 
effectiveness tests. To acknowledge the fact that low-income CDM 
programs provide significant social benefits not reflected in standard TRC 
test calculations, the regulation directs the BCUC to apply a 30% adder 
to the benefits of low-income programs in the TRC test. According to the 
testimony by BC Hydro, this 30% adder increased the low-income program’s 
TRC benefit–cost ratio from 0.9 to 1.2, so it no longer falls below the TRC 
threshold of 1.0.127
3.3.2 State of California
3.3.2.1   Policy and Regulatory Context
California has been a leader in CDM initiatives for over 30 years. Its energy 
efficiency programs and policies have had a significant impact on per capita 
electricity use, which has remained unchanged since the mid-1970s.128 
Interest in CDM in California intensified in the 2000s. Public funding for 
CDM initiatives was significantly increased by the state government in 
response to the summer 2000 blackouts. In 2002, California adopted a policy 
of restructuring its electricity system to place an increasing emphasis on 
CDM programs.129 
In 2003 the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC), the 
California Energy Commission (CEC), and the California Power Authority 
(CPA) released the Energy Action Plan (EAP) that set out targets for CDM 
activities as well as for renewable energy and distributed generation.130 The 
EAP also set a ‘loading order of energy resources’ that placed conservation 
and energy efficiency before new energy sources.131 In accordance with the 
plan, the CPUC mandated that local utility companies use all available cost 
effective CDM options before developing or obtaining additional supply 
resources.132 
In 2004, the CPUC established annual efficiency savings goals for 
utilities: investor-owned utilities (IOUs) are expected to save about 1–1.5% 
of total forecast electricity sales per year. By 2013 total annual electricity 
consumption is expected to be reduced by 23,183 GWh and peak demand by 
4,885 MW.133 In 2006, California’s investor-owned utilities reported CDM 
expenditures of $357 million and electric energy efficiency savings of 1,912 
GWh.
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3.3.2.2   CDM Programs: Administration and Evaluation
California’s state-wide and utility-specific CDM programs are designed 
and delivered by both investor-owned utilities and publicly owned utilities. 
The CPUC134 provides general oversight, sets key policies and guidelines, 
and approves spending levels and rates. California’s utilities fund some 
of their programs through procurement funds and through a public goods 
charge (PGC) (0.48 cents/kWh) on customer bills that helps cover the cost 
of energy efficiency, renewable energy and R&D programs and initiatives.135 
In 2003, the CPUC approved supplemental funding from the utilities’ 
procurement funds ($245 million for 2004–2005), in addition to the existing 
PGC funds, for conservation and demand response programs.136 
Various evaluation and screening frameworks have been used in 
California to assess the cost effectiveness of CDM programs since their 
origins in the 1970s. The California Standard Practice Manual, published 
jointly in 1983 by the CPUC and the CEC, provided a standardized 
methodology for conducting benefit–cost analyses of all utility programs 
in California, including load management and energy efficiency.137, 138 The 
manual set up several tests for assessing the cost effectiveness of energy 
efficiency programs, including the RIM test, the UCT, the PCT and the TRC 
test.139 
Currently, the CPUC requires utilities to conduct the TRC test and the 
UCT on CDM initiatives. The tests are weighted, with the TRC test being 
given twice the weight of the UCT.140 Although the tests are applied for 
screening purposes to individual programs as well as at the portfolio level, 
the key requirement is that the utility’s portfolio as a whole meets the 
tests. This approach allows utilities to pursue pilot programs or emerging 
conservation technologies, even though they may not meet the TRC test and 
UCT on an individual program basis. 
The costs and benefits of the TRC test and UCT are currently calculated 
using a methodology and input assumptions developed by Energy and 
Environmental Economics, Inc. (E3) for the CPUC in 2004.141 In addition 
to avoided generation costs and transmission and distribution costs, 
avoided environmental externalities, such as releases of GHGs and other 
air pollutants,142 are considered in the calculation of the benefits of CDM 
initiatives. In particular, when calculating avoided costs, a carbon adder of 
$8 per ton of carbon dioxide is applied. The input assumptions for avoided 
costs are based on the most recent available estimates of market-based 
avoided costs differentiated by time of use (super-peak, mid-peak and off-
peak for summer and winter seasons) and location, allowing for better 
estimates of capacity savings. 
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The CPUC recognises that there are certain limitations to the TRC test 
and the UCT: the Energy Efficiency Policy Manual provides a description 
of the programs that may be exempt from the regular test threshold 
requirements. Emerging technologies programs must demonstrate only that 
they meet the test requirements on a prospective basis.143 In cases where 
the entire portfolio including emerging technologies programs does not pass 
the Dual Test (both the TRC test and the UCT), utilities must describe the 
program benefits beyond those reflected in the standard tests and the long-
term benefits of these programs for California ratepayers. 
The CPUC also acknowledges the limitations of using the TRC test as a 
primary indicator of cost effectiveness in instances where the link between 
the programs and savings cannot be easily established. Programs in this 
category may include demonstration programs for promising emerging 
energy efficiency technologies, programs aimed at long-term structural 
market changes, and outreach and educational ‘information-only’ 
programs.144 In such cases, the CPUC and utilities consider 
alternative or additional factors and performance characteristics 
when screening program proposals and assessing their results.
3.3.3 State of New York
3.3.3.1   Policy and Regulatory Context
New York State is another leading jurisdiction with respect to CDM 
initiatives. In a recent report by the American Council for an Energy-
Efficient Economy, New York was ranked fifth among US states for its CDM 
efforts, moving up two places from its 2007 position.145
The pursuit of cost effective energy efficiency opportunities over the 
near- and long-term has been established as one of the state’s highest energy 
priorities. Energy efficiency policy is considered within the broader context 
of the state’s energy and environmental initiatives, including the adoption of 
a Renewable Portfolio Standard, participation in the Regional Greenhouse 
Gas Initiative (RGGI), and improvements in the state’s energy building 
codes and appliance efficiency standards. New York State recently adopted 
an ambitious goal of reducing forecast electricity consumption by 15% by 
the year 2015 (15 x 15).146
New York was one of the first North American jurisdictions to set up a 
systems benefits charge to support energy efficiency and energy research and 
development programs, as well as energy programs targeting low-income 
consumers.147, 148 Since its establishment in 1996, the range of programs 
and level of funding under the system benefits charge system have expanded 
significantly.
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3.3.3.2   CDM Programs: Administration and Evaluation
A comprehensive set of state-wide energy efficiency, load reduction, and 
market transformation initiatives has been established under a systems 
benefits energy structure through the New York Energy $martSM Program. 
Energy $martSM is administered by a state government agency — the New 
York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA).149 
Two publicly owned utilities — the New York Power Authority and the 
Long Island Power Authority — offer similar programs to their customers. 
Customers of distribution utilities are required to pay a system benefits 
charge on their utility bills. The New York Public Service Commission is 
responsible for reviewing initiatives under the Energy $martSM program and 
establishing funding levels.
On June 23, 2008, the Public Service Commission issued the Order 
Establishing Energy Efficiency Portfolio Standard and Approving Programs 
to help achieve the goal of reducing forecast electricity usage by 15% by 
2015 (15 x 15).150 The order addressed several issues fundamental to CDM 
activities, including adopting three-year targets for energy use reduction, 
and approving so-called ‘fast track’ energy efficiency programs to be 
administered by NYSERDA and certain ‘expedited’ programs to be managed 
by utilities.151 The order signified the shift from a single provider model to 
a multiple administrators’ structure; the aim was to encourage independent 
program administrators to submit proposals “to further expand the range of 
program proposals and to encourage innovation.”152 
3.3.3.3   Cost Effectiveness Tests Used 
For the CDM programs offered under the New York Energy $martSM 
umbrella, the NYSERDA evaluation team uses a benefit–cost analysis 
framework that calculates the TRC test and UCT under three different 
scenarios.153 The scenarios differ in terms of the non-energy benefits 
included in the calculations of avoided costs, with “1” being the least 
inclusive of benefits and “3” being the most inclusive. The 2007 scenarios 
were as follows:
Scenario 1 is similar to the combined traditional TRC test and UCT. It •	
includes avoided costs associated with reduced electricity generation and 
capacity, reduced consumption of natural gas and water, and ‘capacity 
market price effect’ resulting from the decreasing price of capacity due 
to reduced demand. Different assumptions are used when calculating 
energy and capacity costs for upstate and downstate regions. The 
analysis also uses load profiles to differentiate savings by time of day 
and season.154
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Scenario 2 adds participant non-energy impacts that can be quantified in •	
financial terms, including values for comfort, safety and productivity.
Scenario 3 includes macroeconomic benefits.•	
Table 4-3 lists the cost–benefit ratios for each of these three scenarios 
for the TRC test and the UCT.
Table 3‑3   Cost–Benefit Ratios for the New York Energy $martSM Portfolio, 2007
TRC test UCT
Scenario 1 2.1 6.2
Scenario 2 3.3 9.9
Scenario 3 4.4 13.2
NYSERDA recognises that some programs, including emerging or 
R&D CDM programs cannot be adequately assessed by the benefit–cost 
methodology because “these programs are designed to accomplish a range 
of objectives, many of which cannot be monetized in the early years.”155 
For these programs, benefits are assessed qualitatively and progress toward 
achieving energy, economic and environmental benefits is monitored 
continuously.
For CDM proposals submitted by utilities in accordance with the 
Order Establishing Energy Efficiency Portfolio Standard and Approving 
Programs of June 23, 2008, the commission confirmed that the TRC test 
is the primary test used to assess program effectiveness of proposed CDM 
initiatives.156 The commission, however, acknowledged that the TRC test 
does not consider non-energy benefits, and that as a result programs with 
high societal value (e.g., residential low-income programs) or high global 
climate change mitigation potential may fail the TRC test. The commission 
stressed the importance of providing “enough flexibility to guard against 
vital programs being eliminated, or not funded, because of a failure to pass 
this test.”157
In its Program Opportunity Notice, developed as a guide for utilities 
willing to submit their proposals to be evaluated by NYSERDA first 
and then considered by the commission subsequently, NYSERDA has 
provided a detailed list of Efficiency Program Selection Criteria.158 In 
particular, in addition to calculating the standard TRC benefit–cost ratio, 
utilities have to provide a benefit–cost ratio with carbon externality added, 
assuming a carbon value of $15 per ton for each measure/program. If more 
than one program is proposed, a detailed description of various benefits 
at the portfolio level should be provided, including benefits other than 
direct energy savings and demand reduction benefits, such as increased 
employment, positive influence on low-income customers, or environmental 
benefits.
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3.4 Analysis and Conclusions
3.4.1 Overall policy frameworks and supporting regulations
Like Ontario, all jurisdictions reviewed in this chapter have established 
major targets for CDM savings. However, while Ontario established a 
conservation target through the June 2006 Supply Mix Directive, British 
Columbia, California and New York have taken a different approach. In 
addition to pursuing specific goals and targets, each of these jurisdictions 
has mandated the pursuit of all cost effective CDM opportunities prior 
to the approval of additional supply resources. This approach avoids the 
situation that has emerged in Ontario, where it is argued that the established 
conservation target has been treated as a cap beyond which CDM activities 
do not need to be pursued, even if additional cost effective opportunities are 
available. 159 
In addition, all three jurisdictions reviewed in detail in this chapter 
have developed extensive regulatory and policy frameworks beyond the 
establishment of overall CDM targets and objectives to facilitate and 
encourage CDM activities by utilities and other actors. Ontario, for its part, 
has made significant policy commitments with respect to energy efficiency 
and conservation. However, the province’s overall CDM policy framework 
remains fragmented and incomplete compared to that of British Columbia, 
California or New York. 
3.4.2 Flexibility and special considerations 
British Columbia, California and New York use the TRC test as a primary 
test supplemented by one or two additional tests for screening/evaluation 
of CDM programs. However, all three jurisdictions have made specific 
modifications and refinements to their cost effectiveness assessment 
frameworks to allow some flexibility for those CDM programs that might 
fail the TRC test but that provide other important benefits. The modifications 
can be roughly grouped into two broad categories: assessment at the 
portfolio level and incorporation of social and environmental benefits/
externalities. These are briefly summarised below.
3.4.3 Portfolio versus program level assessment
The cost effectiveness of CDM programs can be assessed at three different 
levels: measure, program and portfolio. In Ontario, the evaluation of CDM 
cost effectiveness takes place at all three levels. A portfolio level approach 
to evaluation, by focussing on the benefit–cost ratio for all programs in the 
CDM mix, allows programs with high ratios to compensate for those with 
low ratios but with potentially high social or environmental benefits, as well 
as those programs that are necessary for the long-term success of CDM 
initiatives. 
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In British Columbia, for instance, the portfolio approach is applied 
while evaluating the cost effectiveness of specified demand-side measures, 
including education and awareness programs and technology innovation 
programs. There is a similar requirement for the assessment of CDM 
initiatives in California. 
3.4.4 Environmental externalities and social benefits 
The question of whether environmental externalities should be accounted 
for while calculating CDM costs and benefits is not without controversy. 
However, an advantage of incorporating positive environmental externalities 
into the cost–benefit assessment is self evident: it will increase the benefit-
to-cost ratio of the proposed CDM measure or program and will eventually 
bring more conservation projects to the market. In addition, it has been 
argued that the inclusion of these benefits would reflect the wider goals, 
beyond the least-cost provision of energy services, that are now being 
established by governments for CDM initiatives, such as reductions in GHG 
emissions.160 In this context, it has also been argued that discount rates of 
zero or even negative discount rates should be applied to the environmental 
benefits of CDM activities, as benefits such as reductions in GHG emissions 
may actually be of greater value to future generations than to present 
generations.161 On the other hand, the precise value of environmental and 
social benefits is difficult to estimate in monetary terms.
There are various ways to account for externalities. CDM programs in 
California, for example, are structured to include environmental externalities 
(such as avoided costs of GHGs and other air pollutants). To achieve this, 
when calculating avoided costs a carbon adder of $8 per ton of carbon 
dioxide is applied. New York follows a slightly different approach by 
calculating the cost–benefit tests for its Energy $martSM Portfolio Programs 
with two tests (the TRC test and the UCT) under three different scenarios, 
excluding and including non-energy benefits. Another option is a qualitative 
assessment of various non-energy benefits provided by the CDM initiative at 
the portfolio level. NYSERDA uses this approach for the recently developed 
Efficiency Program Selection Criteria list that requires utilities to provide 
a detailed description of various benefits at the portfolio level, such as 
increased employment and environmental gains. 
Another way to approach the issue of quantifying social benefits is to 
assign a certain percentage of program benefits as an adder or a multiplier. 
British Columbia has done this for its low-income efficiency programs under 
its DSM regulation that required the BCUC to increase the benefits in the 
TRC test by 30% when considering the cost effectiveness of a low-income 
program.
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4 The TRC Test in 
Practice: Interview 
Results 
4.1 Introduction
To better understand the impact of the existing CDM regulatory framework 
on CDM initiatives and programming by Ontario LDCs, a series of 
interviews was conducted with LDC staff involved in the design and delivery 
of such initiatives. Interviews were also conducted with a number of other 
key informants in the CDM field in Ontario. The interviews were aimed at 
gaining insight into the impact of the TRC test on CDM programming by 
LDCs, as well as the broader policy and regulatory context within which 
CDM activities take place in Ontario. 
In total, seven interviews — five with staff of different LDCs and two 
with OPA staff — were conducted.162 The interviews were carried out either 
in person or over the phone and lasted from 30 minutes to one hour each. 
Since the goal of the interviews was to obtain both specific and broader 
contextual information, a semi-formal interview structure based on a core 
set of questions was employed. The questions served as guidelines that 
ensured coverage of key research themes while also providing flexibility 
to the interviewees to address other issues around these themes. The 
interview questions are provided in Appendix 1.
Despite variances in respondents’ answers to the interview questions, 
several consistent messages emerged from the interviews. These are 
summarised below.
4.2 Impact of the TRC Test on CDM Program 
Design and Delivery in Ontario
4.2.1 Serves as a business planning and evaluation tool
All interviewees described the TRC test as a useful business planning 
tool that serves several important functions. It is used to screen potential 
programs at the design and development stage, as well as to refine certain 
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elements of programs once they are implemented. The TRC test also drives 
the SSM incentive mechanism in cases where CDM programs are funded 
through distribution rates. The TRC test measures the overall economic 
efficiency of CDM measures, programs or portfolios from the perspective of 
society. It also gauges the effects of a CDM activity on both the distribution 
company and its customers. 
The TRC test, however, is not without limitations. These limitations 
can be associated with the structure of the test, the way it is applied or the 
broader policy and regulatory environment in which CDM activities occur. 
4.2.2 Barriers to non-standard CDM programs
A number of interviewees noted that the TRC test is an inherent disincentive 
for LDCs to pursue customised programs as opposed to delivering programs 
from the OPA’s standard program list. Gathering information on inputs for 
the TRC cost–benefit analysis and estimating costs and benefits for non-
standard programs for the purposes of a rate application to the OEB or a 
funding request to the OPA can be a costly and time-consuming exercise. 
The requirements are especially challenging for smaller LDCs that lack 
in-house analytical capacity or financial resources for contracting outside 
expertise.
TRC test-related barriers to non-standard programs need to be viewed 
within a broader policy and regulatory context for CDM activities in 
Ontario. Many interviewees noted that their LDCs offered a wider range 
of customised programs when they received funding (subject to OEB 
approval) through their distribution rates. However, many of these programs 
were downsized or eliminated when the OPA assumed the role of primary 
funder of CDM activities. The OPA’s lack of interest in non-standard CDM 
programs was commonly cited as one of the reasons for not continuing to 
pursue customised programs. While LDCs still have the option of applying 
directly to the OEB for funding through distribution rates for “programs for 
which no OPA funding is available,”163 as noted above, this route can be 
problematic for smaller LDCs as they typically lack the financial and staff 
resources needed to conduct TRC test analyses of custom programs. 
Two types of programs were consistently identified during the interviews 
as being negatively affected by the TRC test:
new measures or programs with limited data on their performance•	
educational types of programs, which can be essential to increasing •	
the portion of consumers participating in programs and improving 
their ability to make use of the technologies, practices and information 
offered through CDM programs. 
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4.2.2.1   Impacts on New or Innovative Programs 
A number of interviewees stressed the importance of experimentation and 
innovation in conservation and energy efficiency, pointing out that staying 
with the limited range of standard programs may bring some short-term 
energy savings, but will be insufficient to achieve longer-term conservation 
goals. The TRC test can become a barrier for such innovative CDM 
programs simply as these projects are still being tested and have not been 
tried out at a market scale. Proven statistical data on the impacts of new 
technologies (such as in-home energy consumption monitors or parking lot 
plug-in control devices) on energy consumption may be lacking, yet their 
potential benefits may be high. The only way to discover whether these 
programs deliver actual energy savings is to experiment with them. 
There was a consistent message that the requirement to meet the TRC 
test upfront discourages LDCs from experimenting with or implementing 
innovative programs. Several respondents suggested that there should be 
special provisions for innovative pilot programs, similar to that provided in 
the TRC test guide by the OEB, which would allow promising innovative 
projects to proceed despite the lack of solid TRC test data. 
4.2.2.2   Impacts on Programs Designed to Achieve Long-Term 
Behavioural Changes
Another consistent message conveyed in the interviews concerned the 
negative impact of the TRC test on programs aimed at achieving long-term 
changes in customers’ behaviour. These types of education and awareness 
programs do not necessarily deliver short-term energy savings but they are 
necessary for making the transition towards a culture of conservation and for 
long-term market transformation and capacity building. Examples of such 
programs mentioned during the interviews included presentations in schools 
by LDC representatives and the demonstration and promotion of new 
technologies (e.g., plug-in meters). Using the TRC test to assess the cost 
effectiveness of such programs is problematic as the programs are unlikely 
to yield measurable short-term conservation benefits, and in most cases it 
is difficult to establish a direct link between the program and actual energy 
savings.
The requirement to demonstrate the impact of these programs, and the 
challenge in being able to do so, has led LDCs to reject them altogether 
or to seek funding for such programs from sources other than the OPA. 
Some LDCs combine education and awareness programs with other CDM 
measures/programs that show strong positive TRC test results to ensure that 
their CDM initiatives are TRC positive as a package. Another common way 
for LDCs to fund these programs is to use some of the money received for 
delivering other standard CDM programs to run education and awareness 
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programs. Finally, some LDCs opt to apply directly to the OEB to finance 
education and awareness programs through their distribution rates. 
4.2.3 Portfolio fragmentation 
Another concern with the TRC test expressed during the interviews was 
that applying the test to individual program measures or components rather 
than to the program as a package discourages integration of CDM activities 
and programs.164 This point is in keeping with the concern about the impact 
of the TRC test on education and awareness programs that often fail the 
TRC test. It was noted that such programs can be critical for the long-term 
success of CDM initiatives and can add to their total positive value in the 
future. Interviewees implied that it would be beneficial if programs were 
assessed under the TRC test as a whole package rather than as discrete 
components.
4.2.4 Specific concerns about OPA and OEB TRC test parameters
4.2.4.1   Encourages Demand Response/Peak Shaving
There was a consistent message in the interviews that the current avoided 
cost structure in the TRC test models of the OPA and OEB favours CDM 
programs targeting peak demand (especially summer peak demand) as 
opposed to those that aim to improve energy efficiency long term and reduce 
overall energy consumption.
There were two major issues of concern expressed by several 
interviewees with respect to the avoided cost structure in the TRC test. The 
first addressed the way capacity costs are allocated throughout the year and 
the fact that the OPA only prices summer peak reductions. There was a view 
that focusing only on summer peak demand-reduction measures can cause 
LDCs to forego potentially effective winter peak programs. It was noted that 
the system can be in need of capacity at any time of the year and that further 
refinements to avoided capacity costs depending on the time of the day and 
season should occur.
The second issue of concern was the focus of the OPA and the OEB 
on reducing peak demand as opposed to total energy demand. Several 
LDCs provided examples of efficiency-based programs that failed the TRC 
test because the current avoided cost structure favours demand response 
programs. It was noted, however, that the current situation is not the fault of 
the OEB or the OPA but rather is a result of a poor policy design. There is 
a built-in policy bias that encourages LDCs to deliver programs that shave 
peak use as opposed to improve overall long-term efficiency. This bias needs 
to be corrected for utilities to be able to deliver both demand response and 
base load reduction programs. 
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4.2.4.2   Fails to Consider Avoided Environmental Externalities 
The current TRC tests employed by the OPA and OEB do not take into 
consideration avoided environmental externalities resulting from CDM 
initiatives, such as the benefits of avoided GHG emissions or reduced air 
pollution. Although there were concerns expressed by some interviewees 
with the way the value of avoided externalities might be calculated and 
the potential issue of adding to the overall complexity of the cost–benefit 
calculations, there was general agreement that incorporating avoided 
environmental externalities into the tests used by the OEB and OPA would 
be highly beneficial to CDM initiatives in Ontario.
It was noted that, given the rising concerns about climate change, and 
the provincial government’s own commitments regarding the reduction 
of GHG emissions, it might be the right time to implement a societal test 
(essentially a TRC test that includes avoided externalities) to encourage and 
facilitate CDM program development in the province. It was noted however 
that direction to do this would need to come from the provincial government. 
The OPA and OEB are unlikely to undertake such an initiative on their own. 
British Columbia with its recently implemented carbon tax was often 
cited as an example of a jurisdiction that is clearly recognising the value of 
reducing CO2 emissions. Most interviewees stressed the importance of the 
value of avoided environmental costs being established by the provincial 
government (either in absolute terms, e.g., $10/ton of CO2 as in BC, or as a 
certain percentage adder) rather than calculated on a case-by-case basis. The 
latter would be a potentially costly and contentious exercise.
4.2.4.3   Lacks Program Specific Free Ridership Rate
Two major concerns with free ridership rates employed in the OPA TRC test 
were repeatedly expressed in the interviews. The first had to do with using 
a universal free ridership rate as opposed to program specific assumptions. 
The second dealt with the failure to consider the potential for free ridership 
to be reduced over time.
A number of the interviewees expressed concern regarding the standard 
(30%) free ridership rate that has been assigned to all CDM programs by the 
OPA. There was a strong feeling that free ridership rates should be program 
specific. In addition it was felt that the free ridership rate should be allowed 
to be reduced over time since the number of free riders usually decreases as 
LDCs acquire more experience with programs and refine them over time.
The issue may be resolved as the OPA has recently recognised that the 
free ridership rate is a function of program design and delivery and should 
be determined through the program monitoring and evaluation process.165
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4.2.4.4   Uses Non-specific Avoided Distribution Costs
The current test applied by the OPA employs standard assumptions regarding 
the avoided distribution costs that can be attributed to CDM initiatives. 
Many of the LDC interviewees noted that avoided distribution costs can be 
highly case specific, and in some cases the avoided costs are significantly 
higher than the assumptions embedded in the current test. The result is 
that the actual avoided costs may be significantly undervalued in TRC 
assessments. It was noted that CDM can result in savings on distribution and 
transmission costs, which in combination can amount to approximately 20% 
of utility bills.  
4.2.5 The Need for Additional Tests
Given the above mentioned limitations of the TRC test identified in the 
interviews, all interviewees agreed that although the TRC can be a useful 
decision-making tool it should not be the only one employed for decision-
making purposes with respect to CDM programs. This point was emphasized 
with respect to programs that do not perform well under the test but have 
other important benefits, such as educational programs or innovative 
programs necessary for capacity building.
Although there was no universal agreement on what other tests should 
be used, interviewees mentioned most of the standard cost effectiveness 
tests, including the RIM test, the PCT and PAC test,166 that could be used 
in addition to the TRC test. It was noted that all tests have limitations, but 
using tests in combination allows for the assessment of a CDM measure/
program from different perspectives. The key message was that the TRC test 
can be used as a first screen, but if some programs/measures fail the TRC 
test they should be assessed with other tests rather than being rejected out-
of-hand. Another suggestion was to use a TRC-based ranking to see how 
different CDM programs compare.
There was considerable discussion of potential evaluation tools for 
programs that do not perform well under the TRC test, such as pilots, 
education and awareness programs and programs targeting certain social 
groups/segments (e.g., low-income households). Although there was no 
universal opinion on how the benefits of such programs should be calculated, 
there was a clear message that the TRC test alone was insufficient for 
determining benefits of such programs and that other criteria (either 
qualitative or quantitative when possible) must be considered when deciding 
whether to pursue such programs. 
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4.2.6 Test used depends on policy goals
Determining the appropriate test to use when screening and evaluating 
CDM programs depends in large part upon the overall policy and regulatory 
framework. Several interviewees stressed that the choice of test depends to 
a large extent on the requirements of the provincial government concerning 
a particular CDM initiative. The TRC test fits well under the current policy 
framework in Ontario: it allows the pursuit of some CDM initiatives that 
are less expensive than supply options while protecting ratepayers’ interests. 
However, while the Ontario government has made significant commitments 
to CDM, unlike other jurisdictions strongly committed to CDM, it does 
not pursue conservation for reasons other than cost effectiveness. It was 
also noted by several respondents that an SCT that considers the social 
and environmental benefits of CDM initiatives would be beneficial for 
CDM activities in Ontario. Clear policy direction from the government 
with respect to the value of conservation would be needed to make such an 
approach effective. The provincial government would have to mandate the 
OPA and OEB to consider avoided externalities, and give clear direction as 
to how the value of such externalities would be calculated.
4.3 Conclusions 
CDM practitioners interviewed about the TRC test in Ontario voiced many 
of same concerns as did stakeholders during the test’s development. These 
concerns were also in keeping with those revealed in the comparative 
analysis of the approaches taken in other jurisdictions to the regulation 
and funding of utility CDM activities. In particular, while interviewees 
highlighted the usefulness of the TRC test as a tool for CDM program 
design and evaluation, they also emphasized that the results of TRC 
evaluations should not be the only determinant of whether programs receive 
support, either from the OPA or from an LDC’s own rate base. Interviewees 
noted that the test as currently applied in Ontario can be a barrier to CDM 
program innovation at the LDC level. Certain types of programs needed to 
achieve long-term behavioural change, such as education and awareness 
programs, do poorly under the current TRC framework. It was also noted 
that the current structure of the test encourages the fragmentation rather than 
the integration of CDM activities, and may place an excessive emphasis 
on demand response and peak shaving activities as opposed to longer-term 
reductions in overall electricity consumption. Finally, a number of specific 
concerns with the existing tests applied by the OEB and OPA were raised, 
including the failure to consider in TRC calculations the value of avoided 
environmental and social externalities resulting from successful CDM 
initiatives. 
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A number of interviewees noted in their concluding remarks that, as 
increasingly more LDCs begin to develop and deliver customised programs, 
the TRC test is likely to become a more significant barrier to CDM 
activities. There was a broad consensus that the conservation potential of 
standardised CDM programs is limited and that greater innovation and 
experimentation in CDM programming will be needed if the full range of 
opportunities for cost effective CDM initiatives is to be realized. 
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5 Conclusions and 
Recommendations
The TRC test is the central evaluative tool applied to electricity CDM 
initiatives in Ontario. This study was intended to explore the impacts of 
applying this test to such initiatives, particularly those generated by LDCs. 
The study comprised a literature review, case studies of cost effectiveness 
tests applied to CDM initiatives in other North American jurisdictions, and 
interviews with key CDM practitioners in Ontario. Specifically the study 
sought to develop an understanding of
the existing institutional, policy and regulatory framework for CDM •	
activities in Ontario, including the roles of the OEB, OPA and LDCs
the current role of the TRC test in CDM decision making by the OEB, •	
OPA and LDCs
the structure of Ontario’s approach to the regulation and funding of •	
utility CDM activities relative to provinces and states that are recognised 
as leaders in the CDM field
the impact of the TRC test as currently applied in Ontario by the OEB •	
and OPA on LDC-led CDM activities and initiatives.
 
5.1 The TRC test in Ontario
The TRC test occupies a central place in Ontario’s CDM policy framework. 
Historically, it was the key test in determining cost effectiveness of CDM 
programs by natural gas utilities; today it remains a primary screening and 
evaluation tool for CDM initiatives in both the natural gas and electricity 
sectors. The TRC test is widely used by LDCs as a planning tool to assist 
in screening CDM programs at the conceptual stage and as a refining 
evaluation tool at the design stage. In addition, demonstrating that a 
proposed CDM activity is TRC positive is the central requirement of the 
OPA when evaluating LDC requests for CDM program funding. The same 
test is applied by the OEB when reviewing LDC applications to fund CDM 
activities through their own rate bases, and for reimbursements under the 
SSM mechanism.
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The study identifies a number of ways in which the TRC test as 
currently structured and applied in Ontario may deter LDCs from realizing 
the full range of potentially cost effective electricity related CDM measures 
in Ontario. Some of the issues identified in the study relate to specific 
aspects of the test and its application, while others relate to the province’s 
overall policy and regulatory framework for CDM activities in the electricity 
sector.
5.2 Policy Framework for the TRC Test in Ontario
The Ontario government has made significant commitments to CDM 
through the June 2006 Supply Mix Directive and other directives to the 
OPA. The province’s CDM policy framework, however, remains relatively 
incomplete in comparison to other, leading North American jurisdictions 
reviewed in depth in the study, namely British Columbia, California and 
New York. Like Ontario, all of these jurisdictions have identified overall 
goals and targets with respect to CDM. However, unlike Ontario, these 
goals and targets have been complemented by a substantial infrastructure 
of supportive policies intended to encourage and facilitate CDM activities. 
These policies have included specific direction to regulatory agencies and 
utilities on the evaluation and assessment of potential CDM initiatives, 
including the specific tests to be employed in evaluating CDM opportunities, 
the consideration of the value of avoided externalities in the evaluation of 
CDM measures, and mechanisms to account for the social benefits flowing 
from initiatives targeted at low-income households. 
By comparison, policy direction from the Ontario government to the 
OEB and OPA did not extend beyond setting targets and goals. It was left to 
the OEB and OPA to determine how CDM opportunities should be evaluated 
and assessed, without further direction from the province. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, the OEB, on whom the bulk of responsibility for developing 
such frameworks fell, responded by building on its past practice with the 
TRC test. The result was a relatively restrictive approach to the evaluation 
of CDM opportunities when compared with California or even British 
Columbia. 
There are a number of specific areas where Ontario could strengthen 
its policy and regulatory framework with respect to electricity related CDM 
opportunities. These areas are outlined in the following sections. 
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5.2.1 Overall policy goals for CDM initiatives 
Ontario’s conservation goals are limited to specific targets in ministerial 
directives to the OPA. California and British Columbia, on the other hand, 
not only have established ambitious energy saving targets, but also require 
the pursuit of all cost effective CDM opportunities prior to the acquisition 
of additional supply resources. The approach taken in these jurisdictions 
avoids the problem that many actors in the electricity policy field argue has 
emerged with Ontario’s directive-based approach — that the OPA has treated 
the conservation target established through the supply mix directive as a cap 
beyond which CDM activities do not need to be pursued, even if additional 
cost effective opportunities are available.167
The recently enacted Green Energy and Green Economy Act, 2009 
establishes a new rate-based funding mechanism for CDM programming 
offered by the Ministry of Energy and Infrastructure and extends the 
directive mechanism with respect to CDM activities first established through 
the Electricity Restructuring Act, 2004. Directives can also now be issued 
to the OEB regarding CDM targets to be met by electricity distributors 
and other licensees. In addition, the legislation adds the promotion of 
electricity conservation and demand management to the mandate of the 
Ontario Energy Board and expands the mandate of the Environmental 
Commissioner of Ontario to include reporting on the province’s progress on 
energy conservation. However, beyond establishing a requirement for five 
year reviews of the energy conservation provisions of the building code,168 
the legislation provides no further statutory direction regarding CDM on 
the part of the OPA, LDCs, the Ministry of Energy and Infrastructure or 
other agencies involved in CDM activities. Effectively extending the target-
focussed directive mechanism to LDCs and other distributors and licensees 
may simply transfer from the OPA to LDCs the risk of directive CDM 
targets being treated as maximums beyond which CDM efforts need not be 
pursued. Additional policy direction regarding the ongoing pursuit of all 
achievable and cost effective CDM opportunities is needed to avoid such an 
outcome. 
Recommendations: 
The Minister of Energy amend the June 2006 Supply Mix Directive 1. 
to require that the IPSP to be developed by the OPA incorporate all 
achievable cost effective opportunities for CDM before additional supply 
options are considered.
.
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The 2. Ontario Energy Board Act be amended to expand the mandate 
of the OEB to include ensuring, 1) the pursuit of all cost effective 
opportunities for energy conservation and energy efficiency, and, 2) with 
respect to the IPSP to be developed by the OPA, the inclusion of all 
CDM opportunities that are cost effective relative to supply options. 
 
5.2.2 The CDM funding regime 
The existing funding regime for CDM activities in Ontario is complex, 
confusing and variable. In effect, a number of different regimes have 
emerged: OPA funding for ‘standard’ programs delivered by LDCs; OPA 
funding for LDC-designed ‘custom’ programs; self-initiated rate based 
funding for LDCs subject to OEB approval; and rate-based funding for 
specific programs flowing from ministerial directives under the Electricity 
Restructuring Act. The Green Energy and Green Economy Act, 2009 adds 
new  rate-based mechanisms for programs offered the Ministry of Energy 
and Infrastructure and LDC and other licensee programs initiated in 
response to CDM directives issued to the OEB with respect to conservation 
targets for electricity distributors. Although potentially useful, funding 
provided through these new mechanisms would be fundamentally at the 
discretion of the Minister of Energy and Infrastructure. As a result, the new 
mechanisms carry with them the same risks of instability and changes in 
policy direction that have been features of the CDM funding regime to date. 
By comparison, in most US states stable and long-term funding for utility 
CDM activities has been provided through rate-based mechanisms, usually 
a ‘public benefits charge’ added to electricity rates. Public benefits charges 
generate stable pools of funding on which utilities and other actors can 
draw to deliver CDM programming.169 The funding regime for LDC CDM 
activities and other CDM initiatives in Ontario needs to be similarly clarified 
and stabilized. 
Recommendation:
3. The Ministry of Energy and Infrastructure initiate a comprehensive 
review of CDM funding mechanisms in Ontario, including the roles of 
the OPA, OEB and ministry, to rationalize and consolidate the regime 
to facilitate and encourage long-term investments by LDCs in CDM 
capacity and programming. 
Potential options for a long-term CDM funding regime identified in the 
course of the development of this study include
limiting the role of the OPA to the delivery of province-wide programs •	
either directly or via contracts with LDCs or other service providers 
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providing a funding pool for LDC and other CDM initiatives via the •	
global adjustment mechanism, permitting LDCs to access up to 2% of 
their annual revenues for CDM purposes
requiring LDCs to demonstrate consideration of cost effective options, •	
including CDM and distributed generation when seeking funding for 
system expansions, effectively requiring them to engage in localized 
integrated resource planning. 
5.2.3 The institutional framework for CDM
As with the funding regime, the institutional framework within which CDM 
activities take place in Ontario is complex and involves multiple actors 
including the OPA, OEB, Independent Electricity System Operator (IESO), 
individual LDCs, Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, Ministry of 
Energy and Infrastructure and, at times, other ministries including finance, 
municipal affairs and housing, and government services. Surprisingly the 
Green Energy and Green Economy Act, 2009 eliminated the one existing 
statutorily mandated institutional coordination mechanism for the province’s 
electricity CDM efforts, the position of the Chief Energy Conservation 
Officer and the Conservation Bureau established within the OPA through 
the Electricity Restructuring Act, 2004.170 Given the centrality of energy 
CDM to the province’s electricity and climate change policy goals, a strong 
coordinating mechanism is needed to ensure the success of Ontario’s CDM 
efforts. 
Recommendation:
4. The Ministry of Energy and Infrastructure establish within the 
ministry an office known as Energy Efficiency Ontario to provide 
leadership in planning, co-ordination and delivery of measures for 
energy efficiency and conservation in Ontario. The office should be 
managed and supervised by a Director of Energy Efficiency who will 
direct the ministry’s energy efficiency and conservation activities, 
projects and programs and report to the Deputy Minister of Energy and 
Infrastructure. 
5.2.4 Specific policy direction regarding the evaluation of CDM 
initiatives 
In addition to establishing more detailed policy direction with respect to 
CDM activities, British Columbia, California and New York have all made 
specific modifications and refinements to the cost–benefit tests applied 
to CDM programs to encourage LDCs and other key delivery agents to 
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pursue CDM opportunities. The modifications can be grouped into two 
broad categories: assessment at the portfolio versus program level, and 
incorporation of social and environmental benefits and avoided costs into the 
cost–benefit evaluation framework. 
5.2.4.1   Assessment at the CDM portfolio level
The OPA and OEB currently require CDM activities to be TRC positive at 
both the individual program level and the portfolio level. The application 
of the TRC test at the individual program level was identified in a literature 
review, comparative studies and interviews as presenting a number of 
challenges in terms of CDM program design and delivery, including the 
following:
The practice encourages fragmentation as opposed to integration of •	
CDM activities and programming.
The practice works strongly against programs that may be important in •	
terms of achieving long-term behavioural changes, such as education 
and awareness initiatives, but for which it may be difficult to associate 
specific short-term reductions in electricity demand and consumption.
The practice works against new and innovative programs for which •	
there may not be sufficient data to establish an impact on electricity 
consumption. 
Assessments of CDM activities at the portfolio level allow programs 
with high TRC ratios to compensate for programs with low ratios but with 
potentially high social or environmental benefits — programs that may 
be necessary for the long-term success of CDM initiatives and new or 
innovative activities. Two of the three jurisdictions studied have emphasized 
portfolio level assessments in their evaluations of potential CDM initiatives. 
In British Columbia CDM programs are required to be assessed only at the 
portfolio level. In California the TRC test is applied at the level of both the 
program and the portfolio, but the TRC-positive requirement only applies at 
the portfolio level.
Recommendation:
5. The government of Ontario direct the OPA and OEB that, while the 
review of the potential cost effectiveness of proposed utility CDM 
initiatives should continue at the program as well as portfolio level to 
ensure the identification of poorly performing programs, the portfolio 
level assessment should be determinative of whether a utility’s proposed 
CDM activities are funded. 
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5.2.4.2   Consideration of avoided environmental costs and social 
benefits 
Two of the three jurisdictions studied in detail provide for consideration 
of avoided environmental costs in the evaluation of the cost effectiveness 
of CDM initiatives. California, for example, includes the value of avoided 
GHG emissions and air pollution in the calculation of the potential benefits 
of CDM activities. Including these considerations improves the benefit-to-
cost ratio of CDM initiatives, making more initiatives cost effective. More 
generally such an approach would reflect the broader policy goals, such as 
reductions in GHG emissions, that the province has established with respect 
to CDM initiatives. 
Recommendation:
6. The government of Ontario direct the OPA and OEB to consider 
the avoided environmental costs of supply in evaluating the 
cost effectiveness of potential CDM initiatives. In order to 
avoid the complex challenges associated with determining 
avoided environmental costs on a case specific basis, avoided 
environmental costs of supply should be dealt with as a fixed 
adder (e.g., 15%) to the benefits of CDM initiatives. Given the 
importance of these benefits to future generations, they should be 
subject to a zero or negative discount rate in TRC calculations. 
Other jurisdictions are attempting to capture the wider social benefits 
of CDM initiatives in their evaluations as well. The British Columbia 
government, for example, has directed the BC Utilities Commission to apply 
a 30% adder to program benefits when conducting TRC assessments of 
CDM programs targeted at low-income participants.
Recommendation:
7. The government of Ontario direct the OPA and OEB to incorporate 
an adder to the benefits of CDM initiatives directed at low-income 
households and communities in assessing the cost effectiveness of such 
initiatives. 
5.3 Impact of the TRC test at the LDC Level 
5.3.1 Disincentives for non-standard CDM programs
The TRC test is widely used by Ontario LDCs to plan programs, help screen 
programs at the design/concept phase and refine the design of programs to 
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maximize cost effectiveness. Unfortunately, applying the test as a condition 
of access to funding carries with it an inherent disincentive for LDCs to 
pursue programs beyond the limited standard package of CDM activities 
for which the OPA offers financial support. This is especially true for 
smaller LDCs that lack in-house analytical capacity, or financial resources 
to contract outside expertise, needed to conduct TRC analyses so they can 
apply to the OPA for custom program funding or the OEB for rate-based 
funding. LDCs may be further discouraged from embracing innovation 
in program design and delivery as any new programs will necessarily 
be experimental and therefore lacking in actual data on which to base 
assessments of potential performance. These programs, then, will fail the 
TRC test and likely not be approved for funding.
A move to portfolio level assessments, as proposed above, would help to 
address these barriers. However, additional steps could be taken to encourage 
the development of new and innovative CDM programming by LDCs. 
Recommendation:
8. The OEB waive the TRC positive requirement for rate-based funding 
of new LDC-initiated programs whose value is up to 0.5% of a given 
LDC’s total revenues for the first two years of program operation. 
Program operators be required to report to the OEB on program results 
and impacts at the end of the two-year pilot period. SSM benefits 
associated with these programs be tied to the actual program results 
achieved. 
 
5.3.2 Disincentives for programs aimed at long-term behavioural change
The need to meet the TRC-positive requirement can also serve as a barrier 
for programs aimed at achieving long-term behavioural changes (e.g., 
education and awareness programs) that are necessary for constituency and 
capacity building. Applying the TRC test to assess the cost effectiveness of 
such programs is challenging as such programs may not yield measurable 
short-term energy savings. Additionally, in most cases it is difficult to 
establish a direct connection between the measure/program and actual 
energy savings. The OEB, for its part, indicated a willingness to waive TRC 
requirements for community awareness programming in its November 2008 
decision regarding Greater Sudbury Hydro.171 
Assessing CDM activities on a portfolio basis, as per the 
recommendation above, would partially address this issue as well. However, 
consideration should be given to the use of alternative evaluative frameworks 
to assess the effectiveness and value for money of these types of programs. 
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Recommendation: 
9. The OEB and OPA develop an alternative evaluative framework to 
assess the cost-effectiveness of educational and informational CDM 
programming intended to result in long-term changes in consumer 
behaviour as opposed to short-term reductions in electricity demand. 
The evaluative framework consider such factors as program reach and 
sustained impact on consumer behaviour assessed via appropriately 
designed and administered customer surveys and other social science 
research techniques. A portion of the total funding for such programs be 
held back pending reporting on actual program results. 
5.3.3 TRC test parameters: Key concerns
In addition to the policy level concerns identified with respect to the 
application of the TRC test in Ontario, a number of concerns regarding 
specific parameters employed within the test were identified in the course of 
the literature review and interviews. These are outlined below. 
5.3.3.1  Emphasis on Demand Response/Peak Shaving
The current avoided cost structure in the TRC models used by both the 
OPA and the OEB favours CDM programs that target peak demand as 
opposed to encourage long-term energy efficiency and conservation. 
The strong emphasis on summer peak reductions can result in missed 
opportunities for potentially effective winter peak programs. In addition, 
the focus on reducing peak demand as opposed to reducing total energy 
consumption can result in the loss of opportunities to decrease future overall 
supply requirements as well as short-term peaking capacity. The approach 
embedded in the current models reflects immediate concerns with meeting 
summer peaks midway through the current decade. As demand response 
programs and increased peaking supply capacity are now being deployed, 
greater emphasis can be placed on deep savings and market transformation, 
which in addition to avoiding the need for additional baseload supply can 
avoid significant long-term environmental costs and risks as well. 
Recommendation:
10. The avoided cost structure in the TRC models used by the OPA and 
OEB be modified to ensure that programs delivering deep savings and 
market transformations are appropriately valued. 
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Modifications to the SSM, which currently strongly rewards high TRC 
measures/programs above medium and low TRC initiatives, may also be 
required to encourage programming targeted at market transformation as 
opposed to short-term demand response ‘cream skimming.’ 
5.3.3.2  Avoided Distribution Costs 
The current test applied by the OPA employs standard assumptions regarding 
the avoided distribution costs that can be attributed to CDM initiatives. 
Many of the LDCs interviewed for the project note that avoided distribution 
costs can be highly case specific, and in some cases the avoided costs are 
significantly higher than the assumptions embedded in the current test. The 
result is that actual avoided costs may be significantly undervalued in TRC 
assessments. 
Recommendation:
11. Actual utility specific avoided distribution costs resulting from CDM 
initiatives, as opposed to standardized assumptions, be employed for the 
purposes of TRC assessments wherever possible. 
5.4 Reporting and Program Evaluation
The provision of greater clarity and flexibility to LDCs in the application 
of the TRC test to their CDM program proposals should be accompanied 
by a strengthened public accountability regime regarding the actual 
results achieved. The Green Energy and Green Economy Act, 2009 makes 
provision for the OEB to require licensees to report publicly on their CDM 
performance with respect to CDM directives.172 While the provision is an 
important first step with respect to public reporting of CDM outcomes, 
a more integrated and comprehensive reporting framework should be 
established. 
Recommendation: 
12. The OEB require that LDCs report annually on the results achieved 
through their full portfolio CDM programming. The OEB publish 
the results of each LDC’s CDM portfolio in a clear, easy-to-read 
consolidated annual report, permitting comparisons of LDC CDM 
performance.
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5.5 Conclusions
Ontario has made electricity CDM a central element of its electricity 
and climate change strategies and has set ambitious CDM targets for its 
electricity system. However, in comparison with other leading jurisdictions 
in North America, its electricity CDM policy framework remains incomplete. 
Significant gaps remain with respect to the policy direction given to key 
institutional actors within the electricity system, and the CDM funding and 
institutional framework is fragmented and confusing. The province’s new 
Green Energy and Green Economy Act has the potential to compound a 
number of these problems, depending on how it is implemented. 
There are a number of well-established models that Ontario can draw 
on in the refinement of both its overall CDM policy framework, and the 
more specific criteria employed to evaluate and assess CDM opportunities 
and initiatives. LDCs in particular have begun to build capacity to design 
and deliver CDM programming across Ontario. The province needs to 
provide a policy and funding environment that facilitates and encourages 
the realization of the full potential of these actors to contribute to the 
sustainability of Ontario’s electricity system. The recommendations 
presented in this report are intended to contribute to the development of such 
a ‘new deal’ for LDCs. 
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General: Impact of the TRC test on CDM activities
Do you feel that the TRC test can deter LDCs from undertaking CDM •	
initiatives? In other words, do you feel that potentially effective CDM 
activities or programs are not being pursued because of the TRC 
test? Can you think of any specific type of conservation measures or 
programs that are not being pursued (even though they may be important 
to the long-term success of CDM programs)?
Did the results of the TRC test affect your decisions regarding what •	
CDM initiatives to undertake? Did the TRC test affect your CDM 
program design and delivery in a negative way? If yes, how? 
Could you give an example of a CDM program that could have been •	
designed and delivered, but was not because of the need to meet the 
TRC test criteria?
The TRC Test: Design and Implementation Issues
Should the TRC test be the only test used for the assessment of DSM •	
projects/programs?
What do your think of the idea that the TRC test should be used in •	
combination with other tests to assess a DSM project from different 
perspectives? (e.g., that of participants, non-participating customers, 
distribution company, and so on)?
Do you have any concerns about particular components the TRC test or •	
the way it is implemented?
Would you suggest any modifications to the TRC test or to the •	
assessment procedure to address these concerns? If yes, what are they?
The TRC Test: Specific Components of the Test
Do you think that the Ontario Energy Board has set an appropriate •	
discount rate for the benefit–cost assessment? If not, what rate should be 
used instead and why?
Appendix 1: Sample 
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Do you think that current benefits (avoided costs) accounted for in the •	
TRC test are too narrowly defined? What other avoided costs/benefits 
should be included?
Should environmental and other externalities be included?•	
Do you think that avoided system distribution losses should be included •	
as a benefit of the CDM program/project? Do you see any problem in 
the way distribution system losses are defined and reported?
Can you comment on the standard assumptions list established by the •	
Ontario Energy Board for the TRC calculations? Are the values used for 
calculating cost/benefits reasonable and up-to-date?
LDCs are allowed to use their own data (where appropriate and •	
justified). Have you ever used this option? Why or why not?
Do you have any concerns with the attribution of benefits or free •	
ridership rates under the TRC test procedure? What modifications (if 
any) would you propose with respect to the attribution of benefits (free 
ridership rates)?
•	
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State Primary 
Test
Total 
Resource 
Cost Test
Societal 
Cost Test
Participant 
Cost Test
Utility Cost 
Test
Ratepayer 
Impact 
Measure 
Test
Other No Specific 
Test 
Required
Arizona Societal
(proposed)  X      
Arkansas X  X X X   
California TRC X   X    
Colorado X X      
Connecticut Utility X   X    
District of 
Columbia     X X  
Delaware X       
Florida RIM X  X  X   
Georgia X X X  X   
Hawaii X X X X X   
Iowa  X X X X   
Idaho       X
Illinois X       
Indiana X X X X X   
Kansas X    X   
Kentucky       X
Massachusetts TRC X       
Maryland       X
Maine Societal  X      
Minnesota Societal X X X X X   
Missouri TRC X   X    
Montana X X      
North Carolina       X
North Dakota       X
New Hampshire TRC X    X   
New Jersey      X  
New Mexico TRC X       
Nevada  X  X  X  
Appendix 2: 
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New York TRC X       
Oklahoma       X
Oregon  X  X    
Pennsylvania       X
Rhode Island      X  
South Carolina       X
Utah Utility X   X    
Virginia X X X X X   
Vermont Societal  X      
Texas Utility    X    
Washington X   X  X  
Wisconsin Societal  X      
Wyoming       X
State Primary 
Test
Total 
Resource 
Cost Test
Societal 
Cost Test
Participant 
Cost Test
Utility Cost 
Test
Ratepayer 
Impact 
Measure 
Test
Other No Specific 
Test 
Required
Sources:
1. Illinois Commerce Commission, States with Cost Effectiveness Tests for Evaluating Energy Efficiency Programs, http://www.icc.illinois.gov/downloads/pub-
lic/en/StateCosteffectivessTests_7-14-08-cm-bh.xls
2. Amann, J.T., Valuation of Non-Energy Benefits to Determine Cost Effectiveness of Whole-House Retrofits Programs: A Literature Review (Washington, DC: 
American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy, 2006), http://www.aceee.org/conf/07neb/A061.pdf 
3. Violette, D. and R. Sedano, Demand-Side Management: Determining Appropriate Spending Levels and Cost-Effectiveness Testing. Report prepared for 
the Canadian Association of Members of Public Utility Tribunals (2006), http://www.camput.org/documents/2006-02-13DSMFinalReport_002.pdf (main 
report) and http://www.raponline.org/showpdf.asp?PDF_URL=%22Pubs/CAMPUT_Appendix_A_Summaries_Final_Revised.pdf%22 (Appendix A: Summaries 
by Jurisdiction)
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Origins
The current regulatory and funding framework for electricity CDM activities 
in Ontario has its origins in a June 18, 2003 directive from the Minister of 
Energy to the OEB. The directive mandated that OEB conduct a stakeholder 
consultation to review options for delivering demand-side management and 
demand response (DSM&DR) programs in the Ontario electricity market. 
Out of 118 stakeholders who expressed their interest in participating in the 
consultation process, 31 representatives from varying sectors (electricity 
generators and distributors, gas distributors, energy user groups and non-
governmental organizations)173 were chosen to participate in an advisory 
group.174 Although the focus of the OEB Advisory Group consultation was 
on the development and assessment of governance models (and the potential 
roles of non-market and market participants, especially LDCs) for CDM in 
the Ontario electricity market, one of the aspects discussed in the group’s 
final report was the process of monitoring and evaluating CDM initiatives. 
On December 12, 2003, the OEB Advisory Group issued its report to 
the OEB. Given a wide range of interests and opinions, the advisory group 
decided to “attempt to present generic options to the Board, identifying 
advantages and disadvantages of each without taking an advocacy role in 
favour of one or the other.”175 The pros and cons of various models and 
frameworks were assessed and presented in the final report by the advisory 
group, but one of the key suggestions was that the TRC test would be an 
appropriate measure for the screening and evaluation of CDM programs in 
the electricity sector.176 The TRC-based evaluation framework was presented 
in the report’s chapter entitled “Ontario Energy Board/Wires Companies 
DSM Framework,” which outlined an OEB regulatory framework and the 
role of Ontario’s electric utilities in designing and delivering innovative and 
cost effective CDM programs. Along with acknowledging some limitations 
of the TRC test,177 the report stated that “the positive TRC requirement 
ensures that the programs are in the economic self-interest of customers and 
have an overall societal benefit from a financial point of view.”178, 179
Appendix 3: 
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In response, the OEB released its staff report, Demand-Side Management 
and Demand Response in the Ontario Energy Sectors, on January 23, 
2004. The report essentially provided a range of recommendations on the 
potential role of various actors in the provincial electricity and natural gas 
markets (including the OEB, LDCs and a new central agency) in regulating, 
developing and delivering DSM&DR initiatives in Ontario.180 Although 
an overview of stakeholders’ comments submitted in response to the staff 
report is beyond the scope of this study,181 the comments provided by Green 
Energy Coalition (GEC) and Pollution Probe are of particular interest since 
they directly addressed the issue of choosing an appropriate measure for 
screening and evaluating utility-led CDM initiatives. 
In its staff report the OEB suggested that all utility CDM programs 
should be required to pass the utility cost test. Both GEC and Pollution 
Probe criticised the use of the utility cost test as a screening measure, 
deeming it too restrictive and exclusionary of customer and societal benefits 
of CDM initiatives.182 Pollution Probe pointed to the positive experience 
of Ontario’s gas utilities in using the TRC test for evaluating the cost 
effectiveness of their CDM programs and suggested that Ontario’s electric 
utilities be required to use the TRC test as well. Pollution Probe also 
suggested introducing a shared savings mechanism (SSM) — an incentive 
reward to utilities — and recommended that it be TRC based, i.e., calculated 
as a fixed percentage of the net present value of the TRC benefits achieved 
by CDM initiatives annually. 
On March 1, 2004 the OEB issued its Report to the Minister of Energy 
that included recommendations for the delivery of CDM activities within 
the electricity sector, including the role of LDCs and the potential role of 
a new conservation agency.183 According to the report, the conservation 
agency would “lead and promote conservation efforts by bringing together 
ideas, plans, and best practices from its own research and a range of market 
participants.”184 The report suggested that one of the key tasks of the newly 
established agency would be screening and selecting CDM initiatives 
submitted by any organisation, including LDCs. It also suggested that all 
proposals would be subject to common screening and selection criteria 
and recommended using the TRC test as a common tool for selecting and 
prioritizing CDM activities. Along with making recommendations on the 
potential use of the TRC as an assessment tool, the OEB reiterated its 
suggestion that LDCs be required to use the UCT to ensure that ratepayers 
would not subsidize societal benefits.185
The March 2004 report was followed up on May 31, 2004 with a 
decision granting LDCs approval to apply to the OEB for an increase in 
their 2005 rates in the form of the third tranche of their incremental Market 
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Adjusted Revenue Requirement,186 effectively giving them the opportunity 
to become involved in the delivery of CDM initiatives. To get their third 
instalment LDCs were required to spend the equivalent of one year’s return 
on CDM initiatives. In response to the board’s directive, several LDCs 
submitted CDM plans to the OEB in December 2004 and January 2005 for 
approval and implementation.187 
A procedural order was issued by the board on October 5, 2004 
establishing the process for approving CDM plans submitted by LDCs and 
outlining requirements for filing proposed plans.188 Although the order did 
not specify the cost effectiveness procedure that the LDCs should use, it 
set a requirement that any distributor filing an application for approval of 
a CDM plan had to provide the anticipated program benefits, including 
quantifiable benefits when possible (i.e., energy savings in kW or kWh). 
LDCs were not required to conduct a TRC test to submit a CDM initiative to 
the OEB, though they were advised to use the test when “all of the costs and 
energy savings impacts [were] available” to ensure that programs developed 
were cost effective.189 
On December 10, 2004 the OEB approved applications by several 
LDCs190 for recovery of funds to be invested in CDM programs on the 
condition that the applicants file quarterly and annual reports including 
a cost–benefit analysis on their CDM activities.191 One of the key issues 
raised during the hearings was the lack of a cost–benefit analysis in the 
CDM applications.192 The OEB acknowledged that due to the absence of 
a common assessment framework and lack of sufficient data “there is an 
understandable inability, at this point, to provide the Board with cost–benefit 
analysis that would be meaningful.”193 It, however, stated that in their annual 
reports the distributors would have to attempt a cost–benefit analysis. The 
OEB also assured that in the meantime it would continue to work on the 
methodology for the purpose of the cost–benefit analysis.
Following that decision, the OEB prepared the Draft Guide to Total 
Resource Cost Analysis to assist LDCs in meeting the filing requirements 
for 2005 CDM initiatives and in applying for CDM funding through 2006 
distribution rates. The guide aimed to provide a detailed description of the 
methodology of cost–benefit analysis (the TRC test) that would be required 
by the board. On July 6, 2005, the OEB posted the draft guide on its website 
and invited all interested parties to comment on the document. A number of 
organizations submitted their comments on the draft.194, 195 The submissions 
addressed a variety of issues, most of which were summarised in Appendix 
A of the revised version of the Total Resource Cost Guide.196 While most of 
the submissions sought clarification of some aspects of the draft TRC guide, 
some specifically addressed the structure or the process of implementation 
of the TRC test. The latter are briefly summarized below.
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The Discount Rate•	
Hydro One submission referred to the study by Enbridge Gas Distribution 
and suggested that a social discount rate of between 5% and 9% be used for 
the purpose of the cost–benefit analysis. In response to that submission, the 
OEB stated that although it recognises that CDM has many societal benefits, 
it continues to hold the view that LDCs should use a discount rate equal to 
the incremental after-tax cost of capital.
The Treatment of Environmental Externalities •	
Appliance Recycling Canada Inc., referring to the examples in several 
North American jurisdictions, suggested that the OEB recognise the avoided 
environmental externalities and include them as avoided costs in the TRC 
analysis. In its reply, the OEB stated that although it recognised the benefits 
associated with the avoided environmental damage, “it has not been the 
practice of parties before the Board to include these benefits,” and the 
environmental externalities therefore would not be included in the TRC 
calculations.197 
The Custom Project Free Ridership Rate•	
Several parties, including the Electricity Distributors Association (EDA) and 
several distribution companies, voiced their concerns with the use of 30% 
as the default free ridership rate for CDM custom projects. Pollution Probe 
submitted that the free ridership rate is a function of program design rather 
than technology or measure, and thus suggested that the OEB examine the 
program design of each CDM project to assign the free ridership rate. The 
OEB responded by referring to studies commissioned by Enbridge Gas 
Distribution Inc. and Union Gas Limited that indicated the average free 
ridership rate was 30% or greater. The board concluded that in the absence 
of better information it would continue to use the default values. 
 
Avoided Costs and Other Inputs into the TRC Analysis•	
Vulnerable Energy Consumers’ Coalition (VECC) raised concerns about 
using avoided costs developed in the Hydro One Networks Inc. June 2005 
report, Avoided Cost Analysis for the Evaluation of CDM Measures, as 
inputs in the TRC analysis without addressing the issue of uncertainty 
of these values. In response to this concern, the OEB acknowledged the 
uncertainties and the fact that for some LDCs (e.g., Hydro One) avoided 
capacity cost values were likely to be higher than for other provincial LDCs. 
.
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The OEB concluded that it was in the interests of both LDCs and ratepayers 
to establish a TRC framework that would allow CDM initiatives to be 
conducted using the best information available. The OEB further reaffirmed 
that if LDCs had better information they were encouraged to use it provided 
they could submit supporting evidence to the board.
On September 8, 2005, after reviewing stakeholder comments received 
on the TRC draft, the OEB issued the Total Resource Cost Guide.198 The 
guide contained two major sections:
A detailed manual on how to conduct the TRC analysis, including •	
specific instructions, the mathematical formulae, and examples of 
calculating TRC net benefits at the technology, program and portfolio 
level.
An Assumptions and Measures List that provided all required TRC •	
input data for over 100 CDM measures. This list provided assumptions 
for a range of standard CDM activities and technologies in residential, 
commercial and industrial applications. 
A Notice of Motion filed by Pollution Probe on October 14, 2005, 
prompted further changes to the guide. In its Notice of Motion Pollution 
Probe sought to, 1) abandon the list of standardised free ridership rates 
included in the Total Resource Cost Guide in favour of program-specific 
estimates, and, 2) revise provisions of the guide concerning the attribution of 
net benefits of joint CDM programs to ensure that LDCs could only claim 
attribution for the incremental benefits (as opposed to 100% of benefits) 
resulting from their CDM efforts with a third party. Both issues of free 
ridership rates and attribution rates are of particular importance for LDC-
delivered CDM programs since they directly affect the assessment of TRC 
benefits and, hence, the amount of the utility incentive payment tied to the 
net benefits of the CDM program. 
The OEB’s March 3, 2006 decision responding to Pollution Probe’s 
motion199 stated that there was not “sufficient evidence or argument in 
this proceeding to overturn the use of the free ridership rates set out in the 
TRC Guide.”200 With respect to the attribution rates, however, the OEB 
declared that “attribution of TRC benefits must be made on a case by case 
basis, determined by the centrality of the role played by the LDC in the 
program.”201 The OEB indicated that a change was required to the Total 
Resource Cost Guide respecting the attribution of benefits. The revised guide 
reflecting the OEB decision was issued on October 2, 2006. 
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The TRC Test in the SSM
The development of the screening and evaluation framework for CDM in 
the electricity sector was accompanied by the development of financial 
mechanisms such as the Lost Revenue Adjustment Mechanism (LRAM) and 
Shared Savings Mechanism (SSM) that linked LDCs’ CDM performance 
to their ability to reduce their customers’ bills. LRAM is a technique that 
allows the utility to recover the revenue loss associated with a CDM measure 
or program; SSM is a TRC-based incentive mechanism that allows utilities 
to retain a portion of their net benefit from CDM initiatives.202
On November 12, 2004, Pollution Probe filed a motion requesting the 
OEB to establish an LRAM and SSM for Ontario’s electric utilities. With 
respect to the SSM, the submission referred to the positive experience of 
natural gas utilities with the incentive mechanism and suggested that a 
reward be set at 5% of the net present value of the TRC net benefit created 
by an LDC’s CDM programs.203 Pollution Probe referred to the success of 
the conservation programs at Enbridge Gas Distribution Inc. supported by 
an SSM. According to Pollution Probe’s estimates, after nearly a decade of 
CDM activities Enbridge conservation programs had reduced customers’ 
bills by $785 million. 
The OEB’s December 7, 2004 decision in response to Pollution 
Probe’s motion, allowed LDCs to apply for the SSM to encourage and 
facilitate CDM initiatives. Following this decision, OEB staff issued Draft 
Guidelines for Electricity Distributors Wishing to Apply for SSM Incentive 
for 2005 Implementation of CDM Plans. The guidelines were developed 
to assist LDCs in preparing their applications for SSM approval. After 
reviewing comments received on the draft, on April 28, 2005 the board 
issued Guidelines for Electricity Distributors Wishing to Apply for SSM 
Incentive for 2005 Implementation of CDM Plans.204 The guidelines not 
only set out the general approach of the OEB to considering and approving 
SSM applications, but also outlined key elements of the screening and 
valuation framework for LDC-led CDM initiatives. The guidelines stated 
that the applicant should use the TRC test to calculate net benefits as 
well as specified benefits and costs of a CDM program or a portfolio, and 
explained how to conduct the TRC test (including the need for free ridership 
adjustment) and how to present the final results. The guidelines also 
reaffirmed that a distributor may recover 5% of the net benefits resulting 
from the OEB-approved CDM program or set of programs. With respect to 
the inputs and assumptions that should be used in the TRC test, the board 
recommended using the standard inputs from the OEB’s conservation 
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manual or using LDCs’ own inputs. An LDC that wanted to use its own 
assumptions would have to provide “supporting evidence, an explanation 
of its choice and, for comparison, the TRC test results using the inputs 
contained in the Conservation Manual.”205
The TRC-based screening and evaluation framework was further 
advanced during the process of developing the 2006 Electricity Distribution 
Rates (EDR). The 2006 EDR process was initiated in June 2004 with the 
purpose of creating a thorough and consistent framework that would assist 
LDCs in preparing applications for their 2006 distribution rates.206 On May 
11, 2005, after almost a year of conducting stakeholder consultations and 
reviewing extensive comments received on the first two drafts, the OEB 
issued the 2006 Electricity Distribution Rates Handbook and the board 
report. The board report primarily addressed the following areas of concern:
Choice of the cost effectiveness test•	
The report stated that most parties indicated a preference for using the 
TRC test as a tool for evaluating the costs and benefits of CDM initiatives, 
including calculating the incentive rewards. 
Inputs for calculating costs and benefits•	
Most stakeholders supported the pre-approval of TRC inputs and suggested 
that the OEB provide a conservation manual that would describe a common 
methodology for conducting TRC-related analyses and provide the LDCs 
with data to use in their analysis and reporting on the CDM initiatives to the 
board. The OEB agreed with stakeholders and indicated that the process of 
obtaining inputs for the cost–benefit analysis was under way.207
Shareholder incentives•	
In its previous decision the OEB permitted LDCs to apply for an SSM 
incentive equal to 5% of net benefits (based on the results of the TRC test) 
created by the customer side of the CDM expenditures.208 The decision 
was made in response to the motion made by Pollution Probe. In the 
process of developing the 2006 EDR, several groups, mostly represented 
by industry associations, opposed the introduction of the SSM, while other 
organisations, including environmental groups and non-governmental 
organisations, supported the use of incentives for CDM programs. Those 
parties that supported the establishment of the SSM incentive expressed a 
range of views on how it should be calculated and implemented.209 
.
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In its final decision, the OEB concluded it would continue to use the TRC-
based SSM model adopted in its December 2004 Decision, i.e., LDCs would 
be rewarded with 5% of the net savings estimated by the TRC test. The OEB 
acknowledged that, although more complex mechanisms could be used to 
encourage superior performance in delivering CDM programs, the electricity 
LDCs were at the very beginning of the CDM journey and the existing TRC-
based SSM incentive would suffice at this stage. 
The LRAM, for its part, is determined by calculating the energy savings 
by customer type and valuing those energy savings using the distributor’s 
board-approved variable distribution charge appropriate to each type of 
customer. Hence the LRAM is calculated based on the kW or kWh impacts 
of each program and for each type of customer both gross and net of free 
riders and not on the TRC test results.210 
The Role of the OPA in CDM Initiatives
While the OEB was developing its regulatory framework for the funding of 
utility CDM initiatives, a new actor in the form of the OPA was emerging 
on the Ontario CDM policy scene. In January 2004 the Ontario Energy 
Minister released the final report of the Electricity Conservation and Supply 
Task Force entitled Tough Choices: Addressing Ontario’s Power Needs. 
211 The report highlighted key energy-related challenges and the need for 
CDM initiatives in Ontario and called for “the creation of a conservation 
culture in Ontario.” The framework report set out an action plan that led to 
a range of important legislative and regulatory changes that affected CDM 
initiatives in Ontario. The Electricity Restructuring Act, which came into 
force on December 9, 2004 in response to the task force’s report, established 
a new agency — the OPA — with a mandate to provide a long-term plan for 
Ontario’s electricity system. Specifically with respect to energy conservation, 
the legislation established a conservation bureau within the OPA with the 
primary goal of providing leadership in the planning and coordination of 
electricity CDM.212
On July 13, 2006, the Minister of Energy issued a directive that required 
the OPA to take responsibility for organizing the delivery and funding of 
CDM activities through LDCs.213 Under the directive, funding of up to $400 
million was made available for three years to support LDCs in delivering 
CDM initiatives. The directive also stated that as soon as this ‘Distributor 
CDM Fund’ was established, the OPA would become responsible for 
funding and overseeing the delivery of the majority of LDC-initiated CDM 
activities. According to the directive, the OPA would assume responsibility 
for the design of standard programs, including consumer awareness and 
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education, market capacity building, and market transformation programs. 
Further, LDCs were given the authority to design custom programs and to 
apply to the OPA for funding of these programs. As a result of the directive, 
two streams of funding became available to LDCs for the delivery of CDM 
programs: funding from the OPA and funding through distribution rates.
The Current OEB “Guidelines for Electricity 
Distributor Conservation and Demand 
Management”
In view of the policy change, the OEB decided to undertake a 
comprehensive study to explore the regulatory framework with respect to 
LDC-initiated CDM programs beyond September 2007. The study examined 
such issues as the regulatory treatment of OPA-funded and distribution rate-
funded CDM programs, revenue protection and incentive mechanisms, and 
reporting requirements. In January 2007 the OEB released for comment a 
staff discussion paper of its findings. On March 2, 2007, after reviewing 
comments received on the staff paper, the OEB issued its Report of the 
Board on the Regulatory Framework for Conservation and Demand 
Management by Ontario Electricity Distributors in 2007 and Beyond. The 
report reaffirmed the OEB’s continuing role in LDC-designed and delivered 
CDM activities, including reporting guidelines, program evaluation, and the 
review and approval of proposed CDM programs and applications for the 
LRAM and SSM.214 Further, the report emphasised that although distributors 
may apply to the OEB for funding through distribution rates if funding is 
not available from the OPA, the OEB expected that the majority of CDM 
activities by LDCs would be OPA funded.215
Despite the emphasis on OPA-led funding, given the OEB’s ongoing 
role in CDM programs, it initiated the development of a comprehensive 
document that would include all major policies and guidelines on CDM 
for LDCs within the OEB’s scope of responsibility. On February 8, 2008, 
the OEB issued for comment its draft Guidelines for Electricity Distributor 
Conservation and Demand Management. These guidelines were meant to 
comprehensively address all policies and regulatory requirements developed 
with respect to electricity distributor CDM activities since 2004, including 
the cost–benefit analysis framework. In addition to combining existing 
documents and policies, the guidelines included some new developments, 
including multi-year funding for CDM programs, distribution and 
transmission losses in savings estimates, and enhanced evaluation planning 
and reporting. 
68 York University | Faculty of Environmental Studies
The OEB received written comments on the draft guidelines from 
12 organisations. 216 The comments pertaining to the cost effectiveness 
framework in general and the TRC test calculation and implementation in 
particular are summarised below. 
The consistency of the frameworks and assumptions•	
A number of organisations, including several LDCs, voiced their concerns 
about both an overlap in responsibilities between the OPA and OEB for 
CDM funding and the inconsistency of assumptions between the OEB 
and the OPA for the purposes of TRC analyses. The Coalition of Large 
Distributors (CLD) stated that there should be a single ‘TRC Guide and 
Measures List’ that would apply both to OPA-funded programs and to 
programs funded through distribution rates. Further, the CLD indicated 
that the guide and measures list would need to be updated as often as 
possible. The Consumers Council of Canada (CCC) also stressed the need 
for using reasonable and up-to-date assumptions in both the screening and 
evaluation of CDM programs, since these assumptions play a critical role in 
determining the amount of SSM rewards. The OPA, while raising its own 
concerns regarding the consistency of the TRC input measures, noted that it 
invested considerable effort in collecting and updating the input assumptions 
and suggested that the OPA’s approach should be used by both the OEB and 
the OPA to avoid any duplication. Both GEC and Pollution Probe, however, 
criticised the OPA’s proposed assumptions to be used for TRC purposes. 
GEC stated that OPA’s TRC avoided costs estimates are based on unrealistic 
assumptions for the costs and performance of nuclear generation and 
suggested the OEB values be used instead. Pollution Probe voiced similar 
concerns and suggested the OEB use avoided cost estimates that would 
reflect current market data and Ontario’s historical experience.
The inclusion of avoided environmental externalities•	
The question of whether environmental externalities should be included in a 
cost–benefit analysis for screening and evaluating CDM programs was raised 
by Hydro One. It suggested that, given the importance of climate change and 
the need to reduce GHG emissions in Ontario, the OEB consider including 
environmental costs in the TRC calculations that would encourage LDCs to 
undertake more CDM initiatives.
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The free ridership rate•	
Pollution Probe reiterated its concerns217 regarding the OEB’s continuing 
practice of relying on technology-specific free ridership rates, suggesting 
that free ridership rates were a function of the program design rather than 
the technology. Pollution Probe recommended that the OEB require large 
LDCs to provide evidence to support their free ridership rate estimates. 
Distribution and transmission losses •	
One of the changes to the TRC process introduced by OEB in the guidelines 
was the inclusion of distribution and transmission losses in calculating TRC 
benefits. System losses were previously excluded from the TRC calculations. 
The draft guidelines suggested that distributors include a fixed percentage of 
system losses (4% for distribution and 2.5% for transmission losses) when 
undertaking a benefit–cost analysis of CDM programs. When calculating 
the SSM associated with a program these assumptions regarding distribution 
and transmission losses should result in higher TRC benefits than if the 
avoidance of these losses was not considered.218
The OEB sought comments and suggestions regarding whether all 
distributors should use the same distribution loss values or whether each 
distributor should use distributor-specific factors in the evaluation of CDM 
programs. While many stakeholders agreed with the proposal to use a 
unified value for transmission losses, more criticised the idea of assigning 
a unified value for distribution losses. The EDA noticed that, although for 
many LDCs this policy development would represent a positive change, 
some LDCs could be unfairly penalized because of their system design. Both 
the EDA and the CLD suggested that using an average rate of 4% would be 
acceptable, but using a higher distribution rate should be permitted if the 
LDC could prove that it would be valid to do so. Hydro One suggested that 
using a standard distribution loss factor was inappropriate for rural-based 
LDCs, where the average distribution losses were higher than for urban 
LDCs because of longer distribution distances and lower customer density. It 
recommended that the OEB be allowed to use LDC-specific distribution loss 
factors because of significant differences in the characteristics of Ontario 
LDCs as compared to the standard assumptions employed in the TRC guide. 
A number of other organisations, including Energy Cost Management Inc., 
GEC, Pollution Probe and VECC, also supported the idea of using a utility-
specific distribution loss. In view of such overwhelming support, the OEB 
revised the guidelines to read, “distribution system losses should be those 
specific to the distributor, and be the most recent annual loss values reported 
to the Board.”219
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